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I.
In t r o d u c t io n
For more than a decade, the employment law community, including the 
plaintiffs’ bar, the defense bar, and a cavalcade of academicians, has 
fiercely debated the use (or misuse, as some argue) of arbitration for the 
adjudication o f federal and state employment law cases. The majority of 
the cases at issue in the debate are wrongful termination cases. In most 
wrongful termination cases, ex-employees allege that their ex-employers, or 
their employer’s alleged agents, harassed or otherwise discriminated against 
them, which resulted in their termination (or other adverse action). 
Resolution o f such cases, whether via litigation, arbitration, or any other
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alternative means o f dispute resolution, invariably entails interpretation of 
federal statutes such as Title VII o f the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”),1 the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),2 the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),3 and the equivalent state 
and local statutes that mirror and often bolster the federal law.
Since many employers believe that arbitration is superior to the present 
adjudicative system as a forum for resolving such disputes, numerous 
companies are implementing pre-dispute mandatory agreements to arbitrate 
(“mandatory agreements”).4 Where such agreements are lawful, the 
employers require newly hired employees to sign an agreement to arbitrate 
any and all disputes that arise out o f the course and scope of their 
employment. In contrast to these employers, the majority o f academics to 
weigh in on the subject, as well as numerous other “employee-rights 
advocates,” contend that only post-dispute voluntary agreements to arbitrate 
(“voluntary agreements”) should be enforceable. That is, these individuals 
believe that employees should not have to sign a mandatory agreement to 
forego their right to sue their employers in federal or state court should they 
desire to do so in the future. Instead, they believe that only after an 
employee initiates a claim against her employer should she be able to elect 
to waive her right to a trial by jury.
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams5, the Supreme Court interpreted a 
section of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act6 (“FAA”), to deem mandatory 
agreements generally enforceable for all employees except for those who 
work in the transportation industry.7 As a result of the Circuit City
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
4. See David S. Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense o f  Mandatory Arbitration
o f  Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in 
the Process, 2 U. PA. J. Lab. & EMP. L. 73, 98-99 (1999) [hereinafter Sherwyn et al., Mandatory 
Arbitration] (indicating that some o f the reasons why employers prefer arbitration to litigation include 
reduced costs, increased speed, privacy, and the elimination o f juries). Pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration is a term o f art meaning that employers require employees to sign an agreement under which 
all disputes must be arbitrated. Similarly, post-dispute voluntary arbitration means that both parties can 
choose to arbitrate after the case is ripe.
5. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
6. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). Originally called the United States Arbitration Act, the FAA 
was modeled after New York State’s Arbitration Act o f 1920. See I AN R. M AC NEtL, AMERICAN  
ARBITRATION L a w  181 n.2 (1992). President Coolidge signed the federal Act into law on February 12, 
1925. See id. at 101. For an account o f  the history o f  federal arbitration law, see Barbara Ann Atwood, 
Issues in Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U. F l a . L. Rev. 61, 73-79 
(1985); Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration A c t’s Interstate Commerce Requirement: What’s 
Left fo r  State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 388-89 (1992).
7. 532 U.S. at 119. On remand the 9th Circuit again refused to compel arbitration. This time the 
court held that the agreement violated California law because: (1) the employer offered the arbitration 
agreement on a take it or leave it basis; (2) the agreement did not require the employer to arbitrate all 
claims; and (3) the agreement reduced the damages available to the plaintiff. See Circuit City Stores v.
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decision, these agreements are enforceable in the majority of federal 
jurisdictions.8
Lawmakers have introduced legislation to overrule the Circuit City 
holding and several previous decisions with similar holdings.9 In many of 
its sections, the proposed legislation closely resembles the July 10, 1997 
policy statement set forth by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”).10 The EEOC’s policy statement declared that pre­
dispute mandatory arbitration polices are contrary to the fundamental 
principles of discrimination law and that the EEOC would vigorously 
contest their enforceability.11 The EEOC policy also stated, however, that it 
not only accepts, but also wholeheartedly endorses /wsf-dispute voluntary 
arbitration.12 Like the EEOC, numerous other agencies and organizations 
including the National Labor Relations Board,13 the National Association of
Adams 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002). In a subsequent opinion, the 9th Circuit, in a one page opinion, 
compelled arbitration because the employee had the choice whether or not to sign the agreement and 
there were no “indicia o f  procedural unconscionability.” See Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 
1199 (9th Cir. 2002).
8. See, e.g., Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2001); Cunningham v. Fleetwood 
Homes o f  Ga., Inc., 253 F.3d 611 (11th Cir. 2001); Tuskey v. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 
7410, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10980 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2001); Prescott v. N. Lake Christian Sch., No. 
01-475 Section: “J”(2), 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9793 (E.D. La. June 28, 2001); Olivares v. Hispanic 
Broad. Corp., No. CV00-00354-ER, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5760 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2001); Dumais v. 
Am. G olf Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.N.M. 2001); Roberson v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 144 F. 
Supp. 2d 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Nur v. K.F.C., USA, Inc, 142 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2001).
9. See, e.g., Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act o f 1997, S. 63, 105th Cong. (1997) 
(proposing to outlaw mandatory arbitration o f  all civil rights claims); H.R. 983, 105th Cong. (1997) 
(proposing to ban mandatory arbitration o f  civil rights claims). The Civil Rights Procedures Protection 
Act proposed to amend all key federal civil rights statutes enacted to bar mandatory arbitration o f  claims 
arising under those acts. See S. 63; H.R. 983. For example, § 2 o f  the Act proposed amending Title VII 
o f the Civil Rights Act o f  1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) as follows:
Notwithstanding any Federal statute o f  general applicability that would modify any o f the 
powers and procedures expressly applicable to a claim arising under this title, such powers 
and procedures shall be the exclusive powers and procedures applicable to such claim 
unless after such claim arises the claimant voluntarily enters into an agreement to resolve 
such claim through arbitration or another procedure.
S. 63 § 2; H.R. 983 § 2.
10. See E q u a l  E m p l o y m e n t  O p p o r t u n i t y  C o m m ’n , P o l i c y  S t a t e m e n t  o n  M a n d a t o r y  
A r b i t r a t i o n , E E O C  N o t i c e  N o .  9 1 5 .0 0 2  ( 1 9 9 7 ) .
11. Id. at § IV.
12. Id.
13. See Bentley’s Luggage Corp., 195 NLRB GCM Lexis 92 (1995). In that case, the NLRB 
authorized the issuance o f  a complaint against the nationwide chain o f  100 stores after the company 
fired an employee who refused to sign its mandatory arbitration agreement. See id  at *4. The Board 
took the position that the agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act because it required an 
employee to forfeit the statutory right to file an unfair labor practice charge with the Board as a 
condition o f  employment. See id  at *5. The employer ultimately agreed to settle the case by, among 
other things, distributing a memorandum to employees stating that it would no longer require employees
to proceed to arbitration before filing a complaint with the NLRB. See id  at *4. See also William B. 
Gould IV, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the National Labor Relations Board: Some Ruminations 
About Emerging Legal Issues, Jose Canseco and Gertrude Stein Address at the Inaugural Luncheon of
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Securities Dealers (“NASD”),14 the National Academy of Arbitrators,15 the 
Dunlop Commission,16 and even the National Organization for Women 
(“NOW”) 17 have resoundingly echoed the EEOC’s rejection of pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration. In the words of Patricia Ireland, President of NOW, 
“If proponents of arbitration are correct in their belief that it is faster, 
cheaper and better than the judicial system, then surely employees and their 
attorneys will opt for arbitration in a voluntary system.” Predictably, all of 
these organizations and others have espoused post-dispute voluntary 
arbitration over mandatory agreements.18
Endorsement of post-dispute arbitration, as well as endorsement of any 
alternative form of dispute resolution, demonstrates that the legislators who 
support the bill and the organizations listed above recognize what may well 
be common knowledge among veteran practitioners o f employment law: the 
litigation system currently in place is badly flawed. Because the EEOC is 
under-staffed and overburdened by a burgeoning caseload, the EEOC 
cannot adequately investigate or resolve the volume of cases filed.19 This 
situation, in turn, has rendered the EEOC’s case-filing procedures an 
administrative hoop through which plaintiffs with legitimate claims must
the Greater Bay Chapter o f  the Industrial Relations Research Association (Apr. 8, 1997), in 1997 Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) 69, at E-3 to - 4 & nn. 15-17 (Apr. 10, 1997) (discussing four cases in which the 
General Counsel issued complaints because o f  the use o f  mandatory arbitration agreements), NLRB 
General Counsel Report, 36 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-6 (Feb. 23, 1996). In 1995, the Regional 
Director o f  the NLRB in Tampa, Florida said that “the requirement that an employee or job applicant 
sign a mandatory arbitration policy is an unfair labor practice, as is their discharge for not signing.” See 
Margaret A. Jacobs, Finns with Policies Requiring Arbitration are Facing Obstacles, W ALL S t . J., Oct.
16, 1995, at B5 (quoting Rochelle Kentov).
14. The NASD amended its Code o f  Arbitration Procedures, Rule 10201, effective January 1, 
1999, to eliminate the previous requirement that employees submit all claims o f employment 
discrimination to pre-dispute final and binding arbitration. This is now left to the discretion o f each 
employer. See NASD, at http://www.nasdadr.com/arb_discrim_faqs.asp. (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
15. See Brief o f  Amici Curiae National Academy o f Arbitrators, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379) (supporting Respondents); National Academy o f  
Arbitrators’ Statement and Guidelines Adopted May 21, 1997, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 103 ,atE -l (May 
29, 1997).
16. See C o m m i s s i o n  o n  t h e  F u t u r e  o f  w o r k e r - M a n a g e m e n t  R e l a t i o n s , R e p o r t  a n d  
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  (Dunlop Report) (1994).
17. Ms. Ireland spoke before a committee o f the National Association o f  Securities Dealers in 
June 1997. See National Organization o f Women, at http://www.now.org/issues/wfw/nasd- 
testimony.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
18. See supra notes 9-16.
19. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role o f  Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L. J. 83, 92 
(2001) (noting that the overburdened and under-funded EEOC tossed out many charges after the briefest 
investigations and that the Agency’s backlog had soared past 100,000 charges while receiving almost 
100,000 new charges a year); Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration o f  Employment Claims: A 
Practical Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. R e v . 591, 593 
n.9 (1995) (citing a U.S. GAO Report which states that as o f  February 1994 the EEOC had 88,000 
claims on file, 99.5% o f  which it would never pursue); Sherwyn et al„ M andatoiy Arbitration, supra 
note 4, at 86-89.
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unfortunately jump, while those with frivolous claims gleefully hop on their 
way to court, or more likely, to settlement discussions. When faced with 
litigation, employees with legitimate suits often settle well below the true 
value o f their claims because they cannot afford the time or costs associated 
with going to court. On the other hand, employees are often able to settle 
for sums greater than the true value of their frivolous claims. Plaintiffs 
attorneys calculate the defense-side’s oft exorbitant costs of defense and 
know that the employer, sometimes with deep pockets or an employment 
practices liability insurance policy, is willing to settle for any amount less 
than the costs of winning a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claim or going 
to trial.
As discussed in articles focusing on the topic of alternative dispute 
resolution of employment disputes, arbitration addresses these problems 
because it has proven faster20 and less expensive21 than the traditional 
litigation track. Based on these facts, there is no real debate over whether 
parties should be permitted to arbitrate employment disputes at all. There 
is, however, great concern over whether employers may require their 
applicants and employees to agree to arbitrate all claims that arise out of 
their employment or whether employers should merely give employees (and 
their attorneys) the option of voluntarily selecting arbitration as a means of 
resolving those disputes after they have taken form.
Those in favor of voluntary arbitration attack mandatory arbitration by 
arguing that voluntary arbitration offers the same benefits and drawbacks as 
its mandatory cousin without its intrinsic alleged drawbacks. Advocates of 
voluntary arbitration are correct in one respect, that arbitration as a 
mechanism for resolving disputes offers litigants the same benefits 
regardless o f whether it is a voluntary or a mandatory term and condition of 
employment. That is, whether arbitration is selected or compelled, the 
arbitration hearing itself is exactly the same. However, the one overriding 
problem with post-dispute voluntary arbitration is that, according to the 
evidence carefully examined herein and a logical analysis of the economic, 
political, and legal incentives of the parties and their lawyers, it is extremely 
rare for both the plaintiffs and defense’s attorneys in a case to select 
arbitration after the dispute has arisen. Accordingly, because parties do not 
choose to arbitrate when a case is ripe, voluntary arbitration fails to address 
any of the problems inherent in the current system.
20. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns fo r  Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute 
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO S t. J. ON D lS P . RESOL. 559, 564 [hereinafter Saturns fo r  
Rickshaws] (2001); Ted Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill, Employment
Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical Comparison (Sept. 2002) (working paper on file with the 
author).
21. See Estreicher, Saturns fo r  Rickshaws, supra note 20, at 564. Hill and Eisenberg, supra note
20.
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The purpose of this Article is to explain why parties have not, and 
likely will not, choose to arbitrate an employment dispute after it has arisen. 
To support our assertion, we first explain how plaintiffs and defense 
lawyers select which cases to pursue. Understanding the complex 
motivation of attorneys surrounding the decision o f how best to serve a 
client while simultaneously meeting their own economic needs is critical to 
an understanding of why it is rare for the attorneys on both sides to agree to 
arbitrate a claim after it has been filed. After identifying the lawyers’ 
motivations, this Article poses the question whether these decision-makers 
regard arbitration as positively or negatively affecting their chances of 
achieving their goals. The Article then answers this question by: (1) 
providing the results o f a comprehensive survey o f labor and employment 
lawyers in Chicago, Illinois; and (2) analyzing a post-dispute voluntary 
arbitration system in effect in Chicago from 1994 through 1998. Before 
reporting these results and explaining my conclusions, however, I outline 
the current state of the law that pertains to the arbitration o f employment 
disputes in Part II; and set forth the arguments for and against arbitration in 
Part III.
II.
E n f o r c e a b i l i t y  o f  M a n d a t o r y  A r b it r a t io n  A g r e e m e n t s
The lawfulness o f arbitrating disputes arising out o f Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended),22 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”),23 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”)24 has been the main subject of at least four Supreme Court cases25 
as well as countless circuit court opinions, district court opinions, and law 
review articles.26 Specifically, courts and scholars have argued primarily 
about three areas: (1) whether the FAA applies to employment contracts27,
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000el7 (1994).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634(1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12134(1994).
25. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); EEOC v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
26. See, e.g., Estreicher, Saturns fo r  Rickshaws, supra note 20; Paulette Delphene Hardin, 
Sacrificing Slain lory Rights on the Alter o f  Pre-Dispute Employment Agreements Mandating 
Arbitration, 28 Cap. U. L. R e v . 455 (2000); Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and 
the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. R e v . 1 (1999); Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory 
Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997).
27. See Stephan L. Hayford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and Strengthening
the Law o f  Labor Arbitration, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & L a b . L. 521, 542, 568-74 (2000); Samuel
Estreicher, Predispute Agreement to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 NYU L. REV. 1344, 
1366-67 (1997). See also McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998); O’Neil v. Hilton 
Head Hospital, 115 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 
1997); Cole v. Bums Int’l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (DC Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK
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(2) the effect of § 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 199128, and (3) what 
constitutes a “fair” arbitration agreement. Now, over ten years after it 
became a subject of debate,29 the first issue has been definitively resolved 
(one hopes)30. Moreover, while the other two issues remain unsettled, there 
is a substantial amount of judicial authority from which one can ascertain 
the current state o f the law and predict its likely future. Below, this article 
explains the development of the law concerning each of these issues.
Prior to 1991, lawyers, judges, and scholars generally accepted that 
mandatory arbitration agreements were unenforceable in cases filed under 
federal anti-discrimination statutes.31 This position was based on Alexander 
v. Gardner-Denver Corp.32 In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court held 
that an employee has a right to proceed with a Title VII claim regardless of 
an arbitrator’s adverse decision pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement.33 The lower courts extended this holding to the non-union 
setting and thus, for some years, it seemed clear that mandatory arbitration 
agreements for civil rights claims were unenforceable.34
In 1991, however, the Supreme Court distinguished Gardner-Denver 
in its watershed opinion in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.35 
Gilmer involved an ex-employee, Robert Gilmer, a sixty-two year-old 
registered securities representative, who alleged that the company 
discriminated against him based on age in his termination.36 The company 
filed a motion to compel arbitration because he had signed an agreement 
with the National Association o f Securities Dealers to arbitrate all disputes
Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.
1995); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. duPont, 
443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971); Tenney Engineering Inc. v. United Elec. & Machine Workers o f  Am., 207 
F.2d 450 (3rd Cir. 1953).
28. § 118 o f  the Civil Rights Act o f  1991 was passed as P.L. 102-166, Title I, § 118 amended 42 
USC 1981 to encourage alternative dispute resolution o f claims arising under the Civil Rights Act.
29. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, at 76 n. 16.
30. After Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the law is clear -  the FAA 
applies to all employment situations, except those in the transportation industry. See infra notes 43-52.
31. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (“There is no suggestion in 
[Title VII] that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual’s right to sue or divests federal 
courts o f  jurisdiction.”); see, e.g., Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(holding that Title VII claims are nonarbitrable in nonunion employment settings); Swenson v. 
Management Recruiters lnt’1, Inc., 872 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing commercial from civil 
rights disputes in terms of mandatory arbitration).
32. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
33. Id. at 59-60 (noting that “the federal policy favoring arbitration o f  labor disputes and the 
federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting an 
employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause o f a collective- 
bargaining agreement and his cause o f  action under Title VII.”).
34. See, e.g., McDonald v. City o f  West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
35. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
36. Id. at 23-24.
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that arose out of his employment. Signing such an agreement was a 
condition of working on the New York Stock Exchange.37 Mr. Gilmer 
contended that the agreement was unenforceable under Gardner-Denver,38 
The Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on its facts because in that case 
the arbitration occurred pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement as 
opposed to an individual contract.39 Following the Gilmer decision, lower 
courts extended the holding to apply to other discrimination statutes in 
addition to the ADEA.40
The Gilmer Court based its holding (and distinguished Gardner- 
Denver) on four grounds: (1) “labor” arbitrators are limited to enforcing 
only the collective bargaining agreement that the parties asked them to 
interpret and have no authority to determine if the employer violated federal 
or state statutes; (2) labor arbitrators must enforce the collective bargaining 
agreement even if it conflicts with federal law; (3) in labor arbitrations, the 
union, not the employee, owns the grievance and decides whether to pursue 
it; and (4) the FAA covered the individual arbitration agreement in Gilmer, 
but not in Gardner-Denver where collective rights in a collective 
bargaining agreement prevailed.41 The first three issues provide a clear 
distinction between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer. This was not the case 
with the FAA. In fact, the interpretation of the scope and applicability of 
the FAA was one of the core issues in the debate over the legality of 
mandatory arbitration until the recent Supreme Court decision in Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.42
37. Id. at 23. The employment application signed by Mr. Gilmer provided that the employee 
agreed to “arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy” that arose between the applicant and the 
employer “that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws o f  the organizations” 
with which the applicant registers. Id. Mr. Gilmer had registered with the New York Stock Exchange, 
which has a rule providing for arbitration o f “[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and 
any member or member organization arising out o f  the employment or termination o f  employment o f  
such registered representative.” Id.
38. Id. at 24.
39. Id. at 35. A very unusual aspect o f  Gilmer’s argument is that the mandatory arbitration 
agreement he signed as a condition o f his employment was unenforceable because the agreement 
contained an arbitrator selection clause that allegedly stacked the tripartite panel with older Caucasian 
men involved in the securities business. Mr. Gilmer, a 62 year old Caucasian man, might have been 
hard pressed to convince the court that such a panel would be biased against him in his age- 
discrimination suit.
40. See, e.g., Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997) (New Jersey 
Law Against Discrimination); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997) (Title 
VII and state law discrimination claims); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 
1482 (10th Cir. 1994) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act o f 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1998)); Mago v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992) (Title VII); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & 
Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (Title VII based claim); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 
1991) (Kentucky state law).
41. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (1991).
42. 532 U.S. 105(2001).
2003 BECA USE IT  TAKES TWO 11
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
When the FAA was enacted in 1925 courts generally mistrusted 
arbitration as an adjudicative process and often refused to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate in a variety o f settings.43 Congress enacted the FAA 
to remedy that mistrust. In the broadest and most simple terms, the FAA 
reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”44 Section 
1 of the FAA, however, excludes from the Act’s coverage “contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class o f workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”45 In Gilmer, the Court held 
that the arbitration agreement at issue was not an “employment contract” 
because the parties to the agreement were the New York Stock Exchange 
and Gilmer, not the “employer” and the “employee.”46 Because the 
agreement that Gilmer signed was not an “employment contract,” the Court 
elected not to address the question o f whether the term “engaged in foreign 
or interstate commerce” of Section 1 of the FAA referred to all employees 
or only those in the transportation industry.47 This was the specific issue
43 . See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir. 1942) 
(offering an account o f historical and judicial attitudes towards enforcement o f  arbitration agreements).
44. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); see supra note 5.
4 5 . 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The statute in its entirety provides:
‘Maritime transactions’, as herein defined, means charter parties, bills o f lading o f water carriers, 
agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any 
other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject o f controversy, would be embraced within 
admiralty jurisdiction; ‘commerce’, as herein defined, means commerce among the several States 
or with foreign nations, or in any Territory o f the United States or in the District o f  Columbia, or 
between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign 
nation, or between the District o f Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but 
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts o f  employment o f seamen, railroad employees, or 
any other class o f workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
Id.
46 . Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. This minor detail spawned hundreds o f  lawsuits in the past decade 
and cost litigants millions o f  dollars.
47 . See id. at 25 n.2. The court noted:
Section 1 o f the FAA provides that ‘nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts o f  
employment o f seamen, railroad employees, or any other class o f  workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.’ 9 U.S.C. § 1. Several am id curiae in support o f Gilmer argue that that 
section excludes from the coverage o f the FAA all ‘contracts o f  employment.’ Gilmer, however, 
did not raise the issue in the courts below; it was not addressed there; and it was not among the 
questions presented in the petition for certiorari. In any event, it would be inappropriate to address 
the scope of the § 1 exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in 
a contract o f employment. The FAA requires that the arbitration clause being enforced be in 
writing. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3. The record before us does not show, and the parties do not contend, 
that Gilmer’s employment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, 
the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer’s securities registration application, which is a contract 
with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate. The lower courts addressing the issue uniformly 
have concluded that the exclusionary clause in § 1 o f the FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses 
contained in such registration applications [citations omitted]. Unlike the dissent, [citation 
omitted], we choose to follow the plain language o f  the FAA and the weight o f authority, and we
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decided by the Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams?*
At the time the Supreme Court heard the Circuit City case, nine circuits 
had held that the Section 1 exclusion narrowly applied to only 
transportation industry employees, two circuits had not ruled on the issue, 
and one circuit, the Ninth, had held that the exclusion applied broadly to 
cover nearly all employment contracts.49 The Circuit City Court adopted 
the opinion of the majority of the circuits, holding that the FAA applied to 
the vast majority of agreements to arbitrate in the employment context.50
The Circuit City decision received a fair amount of publicity and 
rekindled the debate on arbitration. The decision’s effect was quite limited 
because, as stated above, it simply confirmed the standing law in nine 
circuits. Moreover, it may not have changed the law even in the Ninth 
Circuit because of that Circuit’s interpretation of Section 118 o f the Civil 
Rights Act of 199151 and because of the Circuit’s holding on what 
constitutes a “fair” agreement.
B. Section 118 o f  the Civil Rights Act o f  1964
In order to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement, a court must find 
that Congress had “evinced an intention to preclude a waiver o f judicial 
remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”52 Section 118 o f the Civil Rights 
Act o f 1991 states: “[wjhere appropriate and to the extent authorized by 
law, the use of alternative dispute resolution including. . .arbitration, is 
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under [the acts and provisions of 
federal law amended by this title].”53 In Duffield v. Robertson Stephens &
therefore hold that § I’s exclusionary clause does not apply to Gilmer’s arbitration agreement. 
Consequently, we leave for another day the issue raised by amici curiae.
Id.
48. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109 (2001) (noting a circuit court split where the majority o f  circuits 
held that the FAA did not apply to employment contracts o f  transportation workers, and the Ninth 
Circuit construed it as not applying to any employment contracts).
49. The following cases hold that Section 1 o f  the FAA applies narrowly only to the transportation 
industry: McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 575-76 (10th Cir. 1998); O'Neil v. Hilton Head 
Hasp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 
1997); Cole v. Burns In t’l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470-72 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK 
Comm., Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1996),- Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 596­
601 (6th Cir. 1995); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); 
Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. <6 Machine 
Workers o f  Am., 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953). The Ninth Circuit case holding that the FAA does not 
apply to contracts o f  employment is Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (1998). As o f  the 
writing o f  this article, the Eighth, Eleventh and Twelfth Circuits have not ruled on the issue.
50. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109 (2001) (confining the exemption o f the FAA to employees in 
the transportation industry).
51. See infra Part 11.B.
52. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens 
& Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998).
53. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (codified in scattered sections o f  2
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Co., another case rejecting mandatory arbitration, the Ninth Circuit held 
that this language evidences (in part) such congressional intent and, 
therefore, it actually prohibits mandatory arbitration.54 Once again, the 
Ninth Circuit represented the minority opinion. The First,55 Second,56 
Third,57 Fourth,58 Fifth,59 Seventh,60 and District of Columbia61 Circuits 
rejected Duffield and held, or in the case of the D.C. Circuit, strongly 
implied, that Section 118 does not prohibit parties’ ability to resort to 
mandatory arbitration of employment disputes, and may in fact expressly 
permit62 it. The other circuits have not yet ruled on this issue.
Despite the circuit split over this issue, and to the dismay o f many 
academicians and practitioners, especially those in the Ninth Circuit, the 
Supreme Court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s Circuit City decisions neglected to 
even mention Duffield or Section 118. Still, at least one California district 
court has held that the Circuit City decision overturned the Duffield 
holding.63 Alternatively, two Ninth Circuit district courts in Oregon have 
held that Duffield is still good law.64
Thus, at this time, mandatory arbitration is lawful for ADEA claims 
throughout the country and lawful for Title VII and ADA claims in seven 
circuits. In the other five circuits, however, it currently remains an open 
question whether employers can require employees to submit Title VII and 
ADA claims to arbitration. There is, of course, one caveat to this 
conclusion: mandatory arbitration polices are enforceable only if  they are 
considered “fair.”
C. What Constitutes a Fair Agreement
Despite the fact that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
54. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185. The court draws the distinction between encouraging and 
mandating arbitration.
55. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
56. Desiderio v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1999).
57. Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 1998).
58. Hooters o f  Am., Inc. v. Philips, 173 F.3d 933, 937 (4th Cir. 1999).
59. Mouton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 453,456  (5th Cir. 1998).
60. Koveleski v. SBC Capital Markets,.Inc., 167 F.3d 361,365 (7th Cir. 1999).
61. Borg-Wamer Protective Servs. Corp. v. EEOC, 245 F.3d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
62. Whether Section 118 permits or encourages arbitration is irrelevant; the only requirement is 
that the statute must not prohibit arbitration. See Sherwyn, et. al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, 
at 102-04.
63. See Olivares v. Hispanic Broad. Corp., No. CV00-00354-ER, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5760, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2001) (“Therefore, in light o f  the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Circuit 
City, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Duffield should not preclude arbitration. . .  .”).
64. See LeLouis v. W. Dictionary Co., Civil No. 00-1719-JE, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12517, at 
*13-14 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2001); Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., Civil No. 01-93-KI, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12601, at * 11 (D. Or. Aug. 9, 2001).
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defined what constitutes a “fair” arbitration agreement, and despite the fact 
that there are those who believe that there is no such thing as a “fair” 
arbitration agreement,65 enough authority exists on the issue to extrapolate 
fairly reliable and comprehensive guidelines. In examining fairness, Gilmer 
and its progeny focus on five issues: (1) the method of delivering opinions;
(2) the procedures for selecting the arbitrator; (3) discovery; (4) available 
damages; and (5) whether the employee entered into the agreement 
knowingly and voluntarily.66 The first three issues are relatively easy to 
define: Arbitration agreements should provide for written opinions, both 
parties must have a substantial role in selecting the arbitrator, and 
agreements must allow for at least some discovery, even if  it is limited.
However, there is conflicting authority on how arbitration agreements 
may limit damages available to prevailing parties. Case law and a mass of 
scholarly work support the argument that arbitration agreements must 
permit an arbitrator to award the same damages that would have been 
available to parties had they prevailed in court.67 Alternatively, there are 
cases that hold, and others imply, that arbitration agreements are 
enforceable even if they limit damages to less than what the prevailing 
parties might have been entitled had their case been heard in court.68
Finally, with respect to employees’ waiver of their opportunity to file 
their claims in federal court, arbitration agreements are enforceable so long 
as they clearly describe the terms of the agreement (for example, the 
agreements must state that they cover discrimination claims and that the 
document is a binding legal contract) and are not hidden in an employee- 
handbook or another long and intimidating document.69 This is the case
65. See supra note 10.
66. The Supreme Court in Gilmer reiterated the so-called savings clause o f  Section 2 o f  the FAA 
(arbitration agreements are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation o f any contract”). Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)). The Court also 
stated that “[t]here is no indication in this case, however, that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was 
coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration application.” Id.
67. See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994). Additionally, 
in accordance with the National Rules for the Resolution o f  Employment Disputes, the arbitrator may 
grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable, including any remedy or relief 
that would be available to the parties had the matter been heard in court. This authority includes the 
right to award compensatory and exemplary (or punitive) damages and other remedies to the extent 
those remedies would be available under applicable law in court. See also JAMS POLICY ON 
E m p l o y m e n t  A r b i t r a t i o n  M in i m u m  S t a n d a r d s  o f  P r o c e d u r a l  F a i r n e s s , at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/employmentArb_min_stds.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2001); Cole v. Bums lnt’1 
Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 
24 Cal. 4th 83, 103 (Cal. 2000).
68. See Degaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 401 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
1996) (upholding an arbitration agreement that prevented the arbitrators from awarding punitive 
damages or injunctive relief o f  any kind); see, e.g., Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 189 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1994).
69. See. e.g., Trumbull v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 683, 687 (N.D. Ohio 1988) 
(denying enforcement where the arbitration o f claims policy was located on less than two pages in the
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even if  the arbitration is “offered” on a “take it or leave it” basis; as the 
Gilmer Court stated: “Mere inequality in bargaining power . . .  is not a 
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in 
the employment context.”70
Even though practitioners and academicians continue to debate over 
the minutia of what constitutes a “fair” arbitration agreement, much 
progress has been made over the past decade towards giving parties 
guidance on how to draft lawful agreements. Now, employers in most 
jurisdictions can confidently draft an arbitration agreement that will be 
upheld.71
D. The Policy Debate
Sometimes overshadowing the ever-evolving technical legal issues of 
arbitration of employment disputes is the often intense policy debate 
focusing on the broader issues at stake. Indeed, while scholars, judges, and 
practicing lawyers have spent countless hours debating, litigating, and 
writing about the technical legal applicability of different forms of 
alternative dispute resolution on different causes o f action, mandatory 
arbitration o f employment disputes has received even more attention from 
those who focus on fairness and other policy concerns.
Interestingly, both critics and advocates of mandatory arbitration 
bolster their contentions with policy arguments. As one would expect, the 
advocates and critics of mandatory arbitration also differ with respect to 
voluntary arbitration. Many critics of mandatory arbitration support 
voluntary arbitration.72 Mandatory arbitration advocates believe, for the 
most part, that voluntary arbitration will not work and that its supporters 
are, at best, naive, and, at worst, hypocritical or disingenuous.73
While this article discusses a number o f the issues below in greater 
detail, the critics’ and advocates’ respective arguments are briefly 
encapsulated as follows:
Critics believe that mandatory arbitration is an unfair process that 
employers force onto employees which impedes the goal of eliminating 
discrimination in the workplace.74
middle o f  a sixty page employee handbook).
70. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33. The 9th Circuit, relying on California contract law, rejects this 
position. See supra note 7.
71. See Cole v. Bums Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 103 (Cal. 2000).
72. See, e.g., National Employee Rights Institute & Chicago-Kent College o f  Law, NERI’s 
Position on Mandatory Arbitration o f  Employment Disputes, 1 EMPL. RTS. &  EMPLOY. PO L’Y  J. 263 
(1997); Stephen Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. Rev. 83 (1996).
73. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, at notes 89-117.
74. See Kathryn Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration o f  Individual Employment Rights: The
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Advocates believe that mandatory arbitration is the most efficient way 
to adjudicate employment discrimination and harassment cases given the 
limited resources of state and federal judicial systems and that the 
agreements, if drafted properly, offer litigants a fair and effective means of 
resolving disputes.75
An interesting and perhaps revealing contrast between the respective 
positions o f the critics and the advocates is the amount of attention they pay 
to litigation and to the EEOC’s resolution process, which are the current 
components of the system in place for handling employment disputes in this 
country. The advocates spend considerable time focusing on the ills of the 
EEOC and litigation.76 The critics tend not to discuss these adjudication 
systems and instead focus on the ills o f arbitration.77
In a previous article, my co-authors and I separated the critics’ 
arguments on arbitration into two categories: (1) complaints that advocates 
contend are overstated or are correctable and (2) complaints that are 
inherent to arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes and therefore 
cannot be corrected, but rather are trade-offs worth accepting in light of 
litigants’ alternatives.78 We also explained why arbitration is preferable to 
the current system for resolving discrimination claims. We do not contend 
to have identified the entire universe o f arguments on the subject. Nor do 
we claim to possess the unequivocally correct solutions, in fact, far from it. 
We do believe, however, that our previous work provides a good 
springboard for discussion because it provides an acceptable, and for the 
purposes of this article, necessary, overview of the arguments for and 
against arbitration.
Accordingly, below is a summary of our prior treatment of the 
arguments against arbitration and our responses to these contentions. First, 
however, is a brief synopsis of the reasons for supporting arbitration as a 
means to resolve employment disputes. A thorough understanding o f the 
case for mandatory arbitration is critical to an understanding of why 
voluntary arbitration is not an adequate substitute or compromise.
Yellow Dog Contract o f  the 1990s, 7 3  D E N V . U . L . R e v . 1 0 1 7  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ;  S te p h e n  J. W a r e , Employment 
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 2 5  HOFSTRA L . R EV. 8 3  ( 1 9 9 6 ) .
75. See supra n o te  2 6 ;  M ic h a e l  G r e e n , Debunking The Myth O f Employer Advantage From Using 
Mandatory Arbitration For Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L .J . 3 9 9  ( 2 0 0 0 ) .
76. See G r e e n , supra n o te  2 6 ,  a t 7 6 - 9 9 ;  E s tr ie c h e r , Saturns fo r  Rickshaws, supra n o te  2 0 .
77. See, e.g., L isa  B . B in g h a m , On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use o f  Statistics 
in Judicial Review o f  Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 M cG E O R G E  L . R e v . 2 2 3  ( 1 9 9 8 ) ;  S to n e ,  The 
Yellow Dog Contract o f  the 1990s, supra n o te  7 4 .
78. See S h e r w y n  e t  a l .,  Mandatory Arbitration, supra n o te  4 ,  a t 1 2 9 -3 9 .
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III.
T h e  C a s e  f o r  A r b it r a t io n
The case for arbitration necessitates a comparison o f this form of 
adjudication with the current system for resolving discrimination charges. 
This Article contends that the current system for resolving discrimination 
claims provides perverse incentives for employees and employers to exploit 
the economic realities o f the system by using the delays and costs of 
litigation to their benefit.
In addition, the current system causes numerous meritorious employee 
claims to slip through the cracks o f a costly and overburdened system, 
while law-abiding employers may be motivated to settle meritless 
discrimination claims. Employers have greater incentive to settle any claim 
if the settlement figure is less than what it would cost to successfully defend 
a case before the EEOC or in court. The result is a system of litigation 
extortion that we euphemistically refer to as “de facto severance.”79 All the 
while, employees with legitimate claims may be forced to accept settlement 
offers that represent only a small fraction o f the real value of their cases 
because they cannot afford the time and/or money it takes to litigate. 
Below we elaborate on the economic factors that create the undesirable 
status quo.
A. Agency Action Creates an Incentive fo r  Employees To Settle Frivolous 
Claims and Frustrates Efforts by Employees with Meritorious Claims
In order to file a discrimination lawsuit, employees must first file a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC or an affiliated state agency.80 If 
the agency cannot induce the parties to settle, the plaintiff may request from 
the EEOC a “right to sue” letter, which will allow the plaintiff to file a 
complaint in court.81 Alternatively, the EEOC may investigate the claims 
and render its opinion as to whether there is “reasonable cause” to believe 
that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff.82 In an extraordinarily 
small percentage o f the cases filed, the EEOC decides that the issue is so
79. See id. at 82 (defining “de facto severance” as a process whereby employees file baseless 
discrimination charges because they know that their former employers are willing to pay a nominal 
amount o f  money in order to avoid the aggravation, cost, and losses o f  time, resources, and productivity 
that inevitably arise in defending such allegations).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994). Employees may elect to file their 
claims with federal, state or local agencies. In most circumstances, the agencies exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction so that claims are cross-filed among agencies. In other circumstances, the local agency is 
independent so that employees’ claims may be investigated more than once.
81. See U.S. E q u a l  E m p l o y m e n t  O p p o r t u n i t y  C o m m ’n , at http://eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html 
(last visited November 30, 2002).
82. See id.
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important that the agency should litigate on the plaintiffs behalf.83 In all 
other cases, the EEOC issues a “right to sue” letter regardless of the 
agency’s decision with respect to “cause.”84 Unfortunately, each step of 
this process costs money and only amplifies the extortive capabilities of 
plaintiffs who file frivolous claims that they only intend to settle.
In 1989, employees filed 59,411 discrimination claims with the EEOC 
and 48,995 claims with affiliated state and local agencies.85 In 2001, 
employees filed 79,896 EEOC charges, which represents a 35% increase 
from 1989.86 With workloads that continue to increase while budgets 
remain relatively fixed, the agencies need to employ systems that resolve 
claims in an efficient manner. Agencies have responded to this problem by 
attempting to induce parties to settle.87 The problem is that when settlement 
is the desired result, the merits of the case tend to lose their significance. If 
the merits are irrelevant, then employees have an incentive to file frivolous 
claims. Employers have an incentive to settle claims, even if  they are false, 
because of the high costs of the agency’s investigation and the even more 
exorbitant costs of the litigation that loom ominously on the horizon.
Responding to an agency’s investigation may cost an employer, 
depending on the complexity and location o f the case, between $2,500 and 
$10,000.88 Litigating a case through trial will cost the employer between 
$50,000 and $500,000.89 In most cases, the available damages are a fraction 
of the costs of defense and there is always the possibility of losing at trial. 
Defense lawyers believe that juries are unpredictable and fear that they are 
inclined to award large sums of money in damages and attorneys’ fees to 
plaintiffs that might not deserve it.90 Thus, strong economic incentives
83. See id.
84. One commentator, Michael Selmi, notes that the EEOC often informs the plaintiff o f  its 
intention to issue a no-cause finding before doing so to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to request a 
right-to-sue notice. Michael Selmi, The Value o f  the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 ,9  n.35 (1996).
85. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CO M M ’N , CHARGE STATISTICS FY 1986-1996 
at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited May 1997). In 1994, there were 158,582 cases 
filed, and 154,609 in 1995. See id.
86. Id.
87. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, at 80-82.
88. Telephone Interviews with David Ritter, Chair o f  the Labor and Employment Department at 
the law firm o f  Altheimer & Grey in Chicago, 111. (Mar. 12, 1998), and Peter Albrecht, partner at the law 
firm o f Godfrey & Kahn in Madison, Wis. (Mar. 12, 1998).
89. Id', David Ritter, Guest Lecture at Cornell University, Sept. 1, 2002.
90. By means o f  an anecdotal illustration, a team o f defense lawyers conducted a mock-jury trial 
before the actual trial o f  a case brought by a plaintiff who was diagnosed as a pathological liar by the 
defense-side’s psychologist. Plaintiff also had absolutely no supporting facts or witnesses to bolster her 
flimsy allegations o f  sexual harassment levied against the most unlikely o f supervisors— a church-going 
mild-mannered, older family man. Enough o f the mock-jurors awarded the plaintiff some damages not 
because they believed that she was sexually harassed, but rather because they felt sorry for her. 
Unbeknownst to the mock-jury, awarding her even a modest sum may trigger a potentially exorbitant
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influence employers to settle most employment related cases.
Employers do not, however, settle all cases filed against them. In the 
years 1992-2000, the EEOC resolved between 68,366 and 106,312 cases 
each year.91 The EEOC classifies each resolved case as either: (1) a merit 
resolution (examples include a settlement, a withdrawal with benefits, or 
finding of “cause”) or (2) non-merit resolution (a “no cause” finding or an 
administrative closing). With regard to merit resolutions in those years, the 
parties settled or “withdrew the case with benefits” in 7% to 13.2% of the 
cases92 while EEOC found cause in only 2.3% to 8.8% of the cases93. O f 
the remaining non-merit resolutions, the EEOC found no reasonable cause 
in 48.1% to 61% of the cases and administratively closed 20.5% to 36.3% 
o f the cases.94 Overall, non-merit resolutions comprised 78.7% to 90.9% 
percent of the resolutions.95 One could argue that the relatively low number 
o f settled cases is evidence that de facto severance does not exist. In fact, 
we contend that the high percentage of non-merit resolutions proves that 
just the opposite is the case.
There are three explanations for the large number of no-cause findings: 
(1) employees do not understand the law; (2) the EEOC is failing to find 
cause in cases with merit; or (3) employees are filing frivolous claims 
hoping for nuisance settlements.96 Even if  each explanation accounts for a 
third of those cases closed administratively or because o f a no cause 
finding, it would still mean that 26% to 30% of the cases filed in each o f the 
last ten years were frivolous. In addition, many discrimination investigators 
and defense lawyers contend that frivolous cases comprise a significant 
percentage of the merit resolutions settled for “nuisance” values.97 The fact 
that employees continue to file frivolous claims supports the contention that 
de facto severance exists and that it is a problem that the law needs to 
address.
Frivolous claims do not just injure law-abiding employers. An 
abundance of frivolous claims taxes the system and means that plaintiffs’
award o f attorneys’ fees. Suffice to say that the frightening and somewhat surreal mock-jury experience 
convinced the employer to settle the case.
91. See U .S . EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CO M M ’N , ALL STATUTUES, at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
92. Id.
93 . Id.
94 . Id.
95 . See id.
96. See Michael Selmi, The Value o f  the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 51 OHIO ST . L.J. 1,9 n. 35 (1996).
97. Conversations with Clifford Penn, Partner at Laner, Muchin, Dombrow, Levin & Taminberg, 
Chicago, IL (Nov. 1994); James Convery, and Joseph Yastrow, Partners at Laner, Muchin, Dombrow, 
Levin & Taminberg, Chicago, IL (Dec. 2001); David Ritten, Partner at Altheimer & Gray, Chicago, 11. 
(Dec. 2001); Paul Wagner, Partner at Stokes & Murphy, Ithaca, NY (Dec. 2001).
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lawyers and EEOC investigators may be unable to devote the proper 
attention to meritorious cases. Without sufficient resources to devote to the 
EEOC’s ever-burgeoning caseload, it is likely that some legitimate claims, 
especially ones filed by injured employees who are not represented by 
attorneys, may slip through the cracks. Thus, if legitimate cases are falling 
through the cracks, it is likely the fault of a system overburdened by 
frivolous claims. The unfortunate result is that both employees and 
employers become frustrated and jaded by the system. Frustration is a 
logical result when employers do not adequately redress employees with 
legitimate claims and employees extort employers who diligently comply 
with the federal and state discrimination laws.
B. Mediation Does Not Adequately Address the System's Flaws
Parties often turn to mediation as a low-cost alternative dispute 
mechanism in the face of burgeoning court queues and rising litigation 
costs. While mediation may lead to relatively painless resolution, it may 
actually exacerbate the system’s endemic flaws. Mediation is not an 
adjudicative process; it is a negotiation process designed to seek a 
settlement based in part on the simple economic reality of what price the 
defendant is willing to pay and what dollar amount the plaintiff is willing to 
accept to make the case “go away”. For many participants, it is ultimately a 
game of compromises, but often little real emphasis is placed on the merits 
of the parties’ respective claims.
In a vacuum, one could quickly predict the effects on both employers 
and employees to be grim. Plaintiffs’ attorneys who know that they can 
mediate claims privately and confidentially may be more inclined to lodge a 
harassment or discrimination complaint with dubious factual and/or legal 
support with the hope that the employer will agree to pay the employee a 
hefty sum of money as long as the amount is less than the cost o f having a 
judge dismiss the claim on a pre-trial motion.98 Conversely, employers 
whose attorneys know that they can mediate claims without fear o f bad 
publicity and without the costs of a lengthy trial may have incrementally 
less of an incentive to prevent harassment and discrimination in their 
workplaces. Mediation as a process for resolving employment disputes 
appears, therefore, as an attractive alternative to parties facing protracted 
and costly litigation. However, this view is myopic. In the long run, 
mediation of employment disputes offers little to benefit employers or 
employees if  the goal of all is to curb discrimination and harassment from 
the workplace.
98. The employer’s decision to settle is obviously also guided by the chances o f success on the 
merits o f  the motion to dismiss. In addition to the merits o f  the case, the chances o f  success are also 
affected by other factors over which litigants have no control such as the jurisdiction and assigned judge.
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C. Mandatory Arbitration Is a Viable Alternative
If mediation as a process is like candy to a sweet-tooth in offering a 
quick fix but causing long term damage not easily discemable in the short- 
run, then arbitration is like a granola bar; not quite as sweet as the candy, 
tasty nonetheless, healthy in the long run and certainly better than the 
alternative, costly and drawn-out litigation— like a plate of liver and onions 
with a side o f over-cooked brussel sprouts."
Arbitrators adjudicate cases for a fraction of what it costs litigants to 
litigate.100 The hope is that the diligently law-abiding employers and the 
employees whose rights are actually violated win cases more often than the 
reverse. In a vacuum, such a result yields proper incentives because well- 
meaning employees will no longer extort employers with the high costs of 
litigation and truly wronged employees will have reduced barriers to the 
damages to which they are entitled. Conversely, mal-intentioned 
employees will be unable to leverage de facto severance payments and will 
receive little or nothing at all. And, mal-intentioned employers will be 
unable to force a plaintiff-employee to accept an otherwise less than 
deserved settlement. Instead, such employers will likely pay full or close to 
full damages. Therefore, in comparison to the alternative forms o f dispute 
resolution like mediation and in comparison to traditional litigation, 
arbitration offers litigants savings in cost and time as well as incentives that 
may actually hinder discrimination and harassment in the workplace.
Employers are therefore wise to implement lawful mandatory 
arbitration programs. Such programs are an effective means for employers 
to pool the risk of liability for being sued for unfounded claims and to 
resolve substantiated claims without fear o f breaking the bank or incurring 
bad publicity that may drive them out o f business. Certainly, many 
employers in the United States who have already implemented such 
programs believe that the benefits of such risk-pooling far outweigh the 
obvious disadvantages o f mandatory arbitration, namely, the near 
impossibility of appealing arbitration decisions and the lack o f a guarantee 
that the arbitrator selected will fully understand the applicable laws.
Mandatory arbitration also simplifies the adjudication process. The 
parties know they must arbitrate, they know positives and negatives o f such 
a forum vis-a-vis alternative and they, hopefully, will attempt to resolve the 
issue. Alternatively, voluntary arbitration raises a preliminary issue: which 
forum should a party choose? Thus, the attorneys must engage in the often
99. Our humblest apologies to the staunch liver and brussel sprouts lobby.
100. Compare Stone, The Yellow D og Contract o f  the 1990s, supra note 74, at 1037 (noting that the 
arbitrator’s fees could easily exceed $1,000) with Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, 
at 132-33 (arguing that $1,000 may be a paltry sum in comparison with the legal fees accrued during 
litigation).
complex and sometimes misinformed decision-making process inherently 
necessary in any voluntary arbitration system. Reducing or eliminating the 
need for such decision making increases the chances o f the parties actually 
adjudicating their disputes, which thereby reduces the incidence o f the 
undesirable incentives described above.
There are some, however, who argue that arbitration is not a suitable 
forum for resolving employment disputes. What follows is an analysis of 
the most common arguments that the critics o f arbitration set forth and 
responses to these arguments.
IV.
T h e  C r i t ic s ’ A r g u m e n t s  A g a i n s t  A r b it r a t io n  a n d  R e s p o n s e s
The critics o f arbitration as a process for resolving employment 
disputes seem ever vigilant. Shared themes often unite the arguments 
launched by a diverse collection of academicians, all branches o f the 
government, political groups, and other interested parties. In reviewing a 
great deal o f the literature on the subject, we have identified several of these 
common themes. In the broadest sense, the arguments may be subdivided 
into two categories; (1) correctable complaints and, (2) arguments that 
attack the fundamental nature o f arbitration as a process.101 Below, we 
explain the commonly voiced complaints that fit into both of these broad 
categories and address them in turn.
A. Correctable Complaints
Critics commonly make five arguments against arbitration that are easy 
to either refute and/or correct: (1) arbitration does not allow for the 
development o f the law; (2) arbitration will adversely effect the EEOC’s 
ability to enforce the law; (3) arbitration is too expensive for employees; (4) 
arbitration may reduce the available damages unfairly; and (5) procedural 
deficiencies of arbitration prevent government agencies from enforcing 
their laws, reduce the statute of limitations, alter the burden o f proof, and 
allow for untrained and unqualified arbitrators.102
The fact that arbitration does not allow for the development o f the law 
is easy to refute and correct. It is easy to refute because that contention 
rests on the premise that in place of arbitration, federal court juries will 
decide cases. In fact, only a fraction o f the discrimination charges filed 
with the EEOC and state agencies end up in court. For example, in the year 
2000 the EEOC resolved 93,672 cases.103 Since the EEOC does not report
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101. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, at note 310-411.
102. See generally Stone, The Yellow Dog Contract o f  the 1990's, supra note 74.
103. E q u a l  E m p l o y m e n t  O p p o r t u n i t y  C o m m ’n , E n f o r c e m e n t  S t a t i s t i c s  a n d  L i t i g a t i o n ,
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the basis for its decisions in individual cases, the law is publicly developed 
only if the case is adjudicated in court. Employees, however, filed only 
21,032 employment discrimination lawsuits in federal court in 2000.104 
Thus, it appears that only 23% of the discrimination charges filed ended up 
in federal court. This does not mean, however, that 23% of the 
discrimination charges resulted in reported decisions.
First, the numbers are not exact for several reasons. Employees who 
received a right to sue letter in 1999 could have sued in 2000, which would 
decrease the percentage above. Similarly, employees could have received a 
right to sue letter in 2000 and then filed in 2001. This would of course 
increase the percentage above. It is likely that these discrepancies, 
however, do not have major effect on the percentage o f discrimination 
charges filed that are resolved publicly.
Two factors, however, could significantly reduce the percentage of 
cases publicly resolved. First, there are a number of claims that plaintiffs 
file with state or local agencies that are not represented in the EEOC data, 
but are included in the federal court litigation reports. It is likely that the 
addition o f such state and local agency data would significantly increase the 
number of resolved cases and thus, decrease the percentage that are 
litigated. Moreover, of the cases filed in court, a significant percentage are 
resolved privately before there is a trial or even a dispositive motion.105 
Finally a number o f cases that litigants resolve by adjudication or motion 
are not reported. What this means is that we can conservatively state that 
more than 75% of the discrimination charges filed are resolved with no 
public report.
The EEOC’s new mediation system provides additional support for the 
contention that the current system does not permit the development o f the 
law at all. Unlike arbitration, the mediators do not even attempt to make a 
determination or a ruling of law.106 Instead, they simply attempt to get the 
two sides to reach an accord. Arbitration is not worse than mediation (a 
system that often eludes criticism) in the way that either system provides 
for development o f the law. In fact, arbitration is much better because it 
offers an adjudicative process instead of one that merely focuses on 
reaching a monetary middle ground. Arbitrators, pursuant to Gilmer, issue 
written decisions that lawyers, judges, legislators, and EEOC officials can
at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
104. See A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  O f f i c e , Ju d i c i a l  B u s i n e s s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  C o u r t s  2000, tbl. 
C— 2A (Sept. 30, 2000).
105. See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis o f  Civil Case Disposition Time, 
5 0  C a s e  W . R e s . L . R e v . 8 1 3 ,  8 1 5 - 1 6  ( 2 0 0 0 ) .
106. Because the EEOC’s mediation system encourages so many cases to settle, these cases have 
no precedential value anyway. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, at 131.
24 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LA W Vol. 24:1
scrutinize.107 This can affect the EEOC’s decision to take cases, influence 
judicial opinions, and lead to guiding legislation. None of that could occur 
after a settlement, an EEOC dismissal, or mediation.
Alternatively, the problem may be easy to correct. The law is clear: (1) 
arbitration agreements cannot prevent employees from filing a charge with 
the EEOC (or a state agency); (2) the EEOC can litigate on behalf o f the 
employees; and (3) the employees can be awarded full damages.108 We 
propose that all arbitration agreements should inform employees of that fact 
and encourage employees to allow the EEOC to review each case. The 
EEOC may then litigate those cases that it believes are critical to 
development of the law. The EEOC should be given a time frame (e.g., 
thirty days) in which it can decide whether it intends to pursue any given 
claim in court. As a desirable byproduct, this simple proposal also solves 
the issue regarding arbitration’s effect on the EEOC’s ability to enforce the 
law. If the EEOC has the opportunity and authority to litigate any claim, it 
can continue to enforce the law.
Moreover, arbitration, if popular enough, could actually enhance the 
EEOC’s ability to regulate the employment discrimination landscape more 
rigorously. The EEOC spends too much time and money investigating non- 
meritorious claims. In fact, in the year 2000, the EEOC classified 78.8% of 
the cases it resolved as non-meritorious resolutions.109 The EEOC could 
better enforce the law if it could defer to arbitration to handle cases that 
lacked merit, did not involve a class o f people, or did not involve a novel 
legal issue.110
Critics of arbitration also contend that arbitration is too expensive for 
employees. This contention may be bifurcated into two complaints; (1) 
some arbitration agreements require employees to pay half the cost o f the 
arbitration, and (2) some mandatory arbitration agreements reduce the 
amount o f damages available to plaintiffs."1 These arguments may no 
longer be valid in some states because of legal authority that holds that 
employers must pay for the entire cost of the proceedings and that they
107. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 22. Arbitrators opinions should be made public, perhaps with the 
names redacted to protect privacy.
108. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28; see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 534 U.S. 279, 306 (2002).
109. See E q u a l  E m p l o y m e n t  O p p o r t u n i t y  C o m m ’n  A l l  S t a t u t e s , at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
110. In EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the EEOC can 
fde discrimination lawsuits on behalf o f  individual plaintiffs and can seek money damages even if  the 
employer and employee entered into an arbitration agreement. Several lower courts had held in such 
situations that the EEOC could only ask for equitable relief on behalf o f  a class o f  employees. This 
Waffle House holding confirms that the EEOC can effectively enforce the law. The agency could 
increase its effectiveness by embracing arbitration agreements. If the agency deferred “garden-variety” 
cases to arbitration it would have more resources to spend on litigating “A” cases.
111. See Stone, The Yellow Dog Contract o f  the 1900s, supra note 74, at 1039.
2003 BECA USE IT  TAKES TWO 25
cannot limit damages.112 Indeed, for the court to consider an arbitration 
agreement fair in California, employers, at most, may require employee- 
plaintiffs to pay for the arbitration costs up to the actual cost that employees 
would incur if they filed their lawsuits in state court.113 Moreover, even if 
employees had to pay half of the cost, which we do not believe they should, 
arbitration advocates contend that the costs associated with arbitration are 
still significantly less expensive than litigation.114
The other procedural deficiencies o f arbitration cannot be dismissed. 
They can, however, be corrected. Critics contend that arbitration 
agreements: (1) reduce the statute of limitations; (2) alter the burden of 
proof; and (3) allow for untrained arbitrators. Each of these points may be 
valid depending on the jurisdiction and the particular arbitration agreement 
at issue, but are easily remedied by legislation or by case law.
B. Arguments Against the Fundamental Nature o f  Arbitration
Three arguments against arbitration center on the fundamental 
elements of arbitration: (1) arbitration is private and allows for little public 
accountability; (2) arbitration limits discovery; and (3) arbitration is 
unfairly biased in favor of employers. The author agrees that arbitration is a 
private process and that arbitration agreements should be permitted to limit 
discovery; otherwise, the incentive to seek alternatives to litigation would 
be reduced. However, privacy and reduced discovery are trade-offs 
generally worth accepting in light o f the alternative o f litigation. As 
discussed in more detail below, we strongly disagree with the third issue.
Arbitration is private. It seems clear that the public nature o f litigation 
deters employers from engaging in unlawful behavior. Thus, a private 
adjudication system theoretically acts as less o f a deterrent than a public 
one. On the other hand, the public nature of litigation may encourage 
plaintiffs and their lawyers to pursue frivolous or doubtful claims against 
deep-pocketed, publicity-sensitive employers. Because of the constant fear 
of the often-devastating effects o f negative publicity, innocent companies 
may be vulnerable to being leveraged into settling wholly meritless claims. 
We contend that this “public-versus-private” issue is a question of trade­
offs, not o f right or wrong.
Similarly, arbitration agreements, almost by definition, need to limit
112. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 104 (Cal. 2000) 
(concluding that damages limitations are contrary to public policy and therefore unlawful).
113. See id. at 113 (holding that a mandatory employment arbitration agreement implicitly obliges 
the employer to pay all types o f  costs that are unique to arbitration).
114. See Ted Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill, Employment
Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical Comparison (Sept. 2002) (working paper on file with the 
author). O f course there will be no costs to the plaintiff employee if  she prevails; fee-shifting provisions 
will place the cost on the employer.
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discovery or else they risk saving participants little, if  any, money or time 
when compared to traditional civil litigation. Discovery, as conducted 
pursuant to state and federal pre-trial rules, is an incredibly expensive 
process. If  alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are to offer any 
economic relief to the parties, they must limit the costs of discovery."5 The 
question is whether this is a positive or negative component of arbitration.
Limited discovery does, of course, reduce the amount of information 
that a plaintiff can access, and therefore, can potentially impede counsel’s 
efforts to prove pretext or find the proverbial “smoking gun” in 
discrimination and harassment cases. And the employment-law plaintiffs’ 
bar is quick to point out that the employee, as the litigant, is most harmed 
by limiting discovery because the employer is invariably the keeper o f all of 
the records and usually, the possessor of the most critical evidence in 
employment law cases.
On the other hand, as mentioned above, limiting discovery 
significantly reduces costs to all parties. Reducing the costs o f discovery 
should theoretically increase access to adjudication. Thus, employees need 
not settle legitimate claims for inadequate amounts because they cannot 
afford the time and costs o f the drawn-out litigation process."6 In addition, 
limited discovery should reduce the number o f frivolous claims filed as the 
value of nuisance settlements would be reduced. Without the high costs of 
defense litigation, employers do not have an incentive to settle frivolous 
claims. Furthermore, to address the employment-plaintiffs’ bar’s concern 
that limiting discovery unfairly injures the employee-plaintiff s ability to 
obtain critical records and evidence, courts have set parameters on the 
extent o f the limitations that agreements may place on the discovery 
process."7
According to critics, arbitration also favors employers because of the 
“systematic pro-employer effect on the outcomes o f disputes.”" 8 In other 
words, critics claim that arbitration is procedurally unfair, or to use a dirtier 
word, “fixed.” To support this rudimentary contention, critics often focus 
on four premises: (1) employees fare better in litigation than they do in
115. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 22.
116. Clients retain most plaintiffs lawyers on a contingent basis— that is, they only get paid when 
they extract money from the defendant— either via a verdict, or much more likely, through a settlement. 
It stands to reason therefore, that plaintiffs lawyers who act reasonably, that is, to maximize their profit, 
would want to settle cases and spend the least amount o f  time and effort conducting discovery. As 
explained in more detail above, if  discovery costs less for plaintiffs, it would be less likely that a 
plaintiffs lawyer would have incentive to settle early.
117. See, e.g., Williams v. Katten, Muchin, & Zavis, No. 92 C 5654, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18301 
(N.D. III. 1996), *13 (upholding the American Arbitration Association’s discovery rules which allow the 
arbitrator to “subpoena witnesses and documents either independently or upon the request o f  the 
parties”).
118. See Stone, Yellow Dog Contracts o f  the 1990s, supra note 74, at 1040.
2003 BECA USE IT  TAKES TWO 27
arbitration; (2) litigation awards are higher than arbitration awards; (3) the 
“repeat-player” effect favors employers; and (4) arbitration agreements are 
unconscionable contracts of adhesion.119
Advocates of arbitration contest and explain each of these premises or 
observations, especially by questioning the reliability of the studies used to 
support them. For example, advocates often attack studies presented and 
conducted by mandatory arbitration detractors that compare plaintiffs’ 
success rates before arbitrators to their success rates before juries.120 Even 
assuming arguendo the reliability of the data extrapolated from such 
studies, arbitration advocates offer several explanations for any disparity 
between the plaintiffs’ success rates. These explanations are briefly set 
forth below.
1. Critics Observe that Plaintiffs Fare Better Before Juries than They Do 
Before Arbitrators
To begin with, many studies cited in support of this observation 
compare the plaintiffs’ success rate at arbitration to the plaintiffs’ success 
rate in cases that went to trial.121 This is not, however, a comparison from 
which any valid conclusions may be drawn. In the arbitrational setting, it is 
extremely rare for an arbitrator to dismiss a case based on a motion to 
dismiss offered by defense counsel and therefore, it is very unusual for 
defense counsel to waste both time and the client’s money developing such 
a motion.122 Arguments for dismissal are typically reserved for the 
arbitration hearing itself or for pre- or post-hearing briefs. However, in 
stark contrast, in the traditional litigation setting, pre-trial motions to 
dismiss are often the primary weapon that defense attorneys use to sink 
plaintiffs’ claims before they ever enter a courtroom. Thus, to ensure a 
balanced and fair comparison, all the cases that courts dismissed as a result 
of any dispositive pre-trial motions need to be included in any data set that 
is compared with arbitration win/loss rates. This is often not the case.123 
The studies done to support this contention are therefore of dubious 
reliability.
119. See Stone, The Yellow Dog Contract o f  the 1990s, supra note 74.
120. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4, at 141-42.
121. See, e.g., Stone, The Yellow Dog Contract o f  the 1990s, supra note 74; Bingham, supra note
77.
122. However, some practitioners advise lodging motions to dismiss with arbitrators. The theory is 
that doing so gives the party lodging the motion an opportunity to educate the arbitrator about her theory 
of the case and puts the arbitrator in the proper frame o f mind to rule in her favor at the hearing. Some 
arbitrators notoriously wait until the day o f the hearing to familiarize themselves with the facts o f  the
case, and by presenting the evidence in the form o f  a motion, the motion-lodger can anchor the
arbitrator’s view on her side.
123. See Stone, Yellow Dog Contracts o f  the 1990s, supra note 74, at 1040.
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Second, as discussed at some length in other works on the topic, there 
is strong evidence that juries favor employees over employers regardless of 
the merits of the case.124 If this is true, arbitration may offer a “fairer” 
forum than litigation.
Lastly, because the cost of defense is lower in arbitration than in 
litigation, employers may refuse low cost nuisance settlements in cases 
where they are confident that they will win. Adjudicating such cases 
creates the illusion o f greater employer win rates at arbitration than at trial.
Therefore, even assuming that the critics’ studies offer reliable results, 
it is spurious to conclude that litigants fare better before juries than they do 
before arbitrators. Rather, it is only safe to conclude that comparing 
plaintiff win rates before arbitrators to their win rates before juries is like 
comparing apples and oranges.
2. Critics Contend that Plaintiffs Receive Higher Awards from  Juries than 
from  Arbitrators
If this observation is true, there are two plausible explanations. First, 
in most cases, the key component in assessing damages is back pay. 
Because it takes less time to arbitrate than to litigate, less back pay accrues 
in arbitration than in litigation. Second, and perhaps most importantly, 
juries may be biased against employers who they perceive as having deep 
pockets.125
3. Critics Assert that Arbitrators are Biased by the So-Called “Repeat- 
Player Effect ”
Critics contend that “repeat-players” (entities that tend to have 
numerous claims against them over time) fare better in arbitration than non- 
’’repeat-players.” 126 From this premise, critics infer that arbitrators unfairly 
favor “repeat-players,” who, by the critics’ definition, happen to be 
employers most of the time. In some instances, critics cite studies 
purporting to lend empirical support for the claim that such an effect, or 
more aptly named, arbitrator bias, exists.127
124. See JEFFREY T . FREDERICK, TH E PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AM ERICAN JURY 7 - 1 0 8  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ;
M ic h a e l  F r i e d  e t  a l , J u r o r  S e l e c t i o n : A n  A n a l y s i s  o f  V o i r  D ir e  in  t h e  J u r y  S y s t e m  in  
A m e r i c a : A CRITICAL O v e r v i e w  4 7 ,  5 2 - 5 3  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;  V a le r ie  P . H a n s , The Ju ry’s Response to Business 
and Corporate Wrongdoing, LAW  &  CONTEMP. PROBS, Autumn 1 9 8 9 ,  a t  1 7 7 ,  1 9 7 .
125. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4 ,  at 1 4 0 .
126. Id  a t n .3 7 1 - 7 2 .
127. Critics cite Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE 
RTS. &  E m p. PO L’Y J. 1 8 9  ( 1 9 9 7 )  despite the fact that Professor Bingham does not conclude that such 
bias exists. See, e.g., E q u a l  E m p l o y m e n t  O p p o r t u n i t y  C o m m ’n ,  P o l i c y  S t a t e m e n t  o n
2003 BECA USE IT  TAKES TWO 29
Advocates of mandatory arbitration vigorously contest the results of 
such studies. First, it is far from clear that any repeat-player effect exists. 
In fact, it simply may not.128 Second, to accuse the arbitrators as a group of 
individuals, comprised mainly o f retired judges or retired longstanding 
practitioners with a deep understanding of employment law, of bias ignores 
the individual qualifications of the arbitrator pool.129 Lastly, mandatory 
arbitration advocates contend that neither employers nor employees are the 
“players.” Instead, the advocates contend that lawyers are the only true 
repeat-players because they both repeatedly appear before and choose 
arbitrators. Because a p laintiffs lawyer can have as many cases as a 
management lawyer before any given arbitrator, the advocates contend that 
a repeat-player effect, if it existed, would not favor employers over 
employees.
4. Critics Contend that Mandatory Arbitration Agreements are Unlawful 
Contracts o f  Adhesion
The last argument concerning mandatory arbitration is that the 
agreements are contracts o f adhesion because employers offer them on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.130 The fact that the Supreme Court has held that 
such agreements are not unlawful contracts o f adhesion does not, nor
M a n d a t o r y  A r b i t r a t i o n , EEOC Notice No. 915.002; National Employment Rights Institute (NERI), 
NERI's Position on Mandatory Arbitration o f  Employment Disputes, 1. EMPL. RTS. & EM PLOY. PO L’Y J. 
263, 264 n.4 (1997); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap and Out o f  Control: Lessons from  the ICANN 
Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. SM ALL &  EMERGING BUS. L. 191, 220 n. 116 (2002).
128. See Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World o f  Securities 
Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. Rev. 1095, 1108 (1993) (reporting that a GAO report found no indication of  
pro-industry bias in arbitrator decisions in “industry-sponsored arbitration forums”). See also, 
Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, supra note 26, at 1355.
129. See American Arbitration Association, at http://www.adr.org (last visited Jan. 15,2002). The 
site enumerates stringent criteria for membership on the AAA National Roster o f  Arbitrators and 
Mediators including, but not limited to, a minimum o f ten years o f  senior-level business or professional 
experience or legal practice, honors, awards, and citations indicating leadership in one’s field, 
membership in a professional association(s) and a reputation o f being “held in the highest regard by 
peers for integrity, fairness and good judgment.” See also Judicial, Arbitration and Mediation Services 
(JAMS/ENDISPUTE), at http://www.jamsadr.com/employment_practice.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2002). 
JAMS maintains a roster o f  arbitrators who specialize in employment law. Their web site boasts o f  
having “neutrals [who] understand the statutes and developing case law that apply to employment 
matters. They appreciate the difficult issues that surround the employment litigation process and the 
risks and opportunities o f  taking employment disputes to court.” Id. JAMS also contends that it is 
“deeply committed to continuing professional development for its neutrals. Briefings on current legal 
developments and how they may affect settlements are a part o f  everyday practice. In addition, JAMS 
conducts high-level education sessions for its neutrals that focus on the many specialties within 
employment law such as sexual harassment, disability claims and the different aspects o f discrimination 
law.” Id.
130. See Stone, Yellow Dog Contracts o f  the 1990s, supra note 74.
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should it, satisfy the critics’ complaints.131 Advocates o f arbitration respond 
to this complaint by pointing to the numerous other acceptable take-it-or- 
leave-it employment policies that employees commonly face. For example, 
employees are often faced with take-it-or-leave-it choices regarding terms 
and conditions o f employment including benefits, such as health insurance, 
vacation, and retirement, non-competition agreements, and unionization. 
With regards to unionization, not only must newly hired employees agree 
that the union already in place will negotiate the terms and conditions of 
their employment, but also the new hires, in the majority of cases, must pay 
dues or “agency fees” even if they do not want the incumbent union to 
represent them. Take-it-or-leave-it offers are simply part and parcel o f the 
employment relationship. Employees in demand can refuse offers of 
employment while others cannot. In the case o f arbitration, the parties can 
negotiate, but they cannot in a union situation.
C. The Compromise Offered by the Critics: Post-Dispute Voluntary
Arbitration
Most critics o f mandatory arbitration advocate voluntary arbitration as 
a means o f correcting the problems explained above.132 Obviously, post­
dispute voluntary arbitration eliminates the concerns about the nature of the 
take-it-or-leave-it arbitration being offered, rendering the contract of 
adhesion complaint outlined above moot. In addition, the critics trumpet a 
voluntary system because it allows the employee the opportunity to weigh 
the procedural defects of arbitration against its benefits to his own situation. 
One can infer from their support o f such a system that the critics believe 
that post-dispute voluntary arbitration allows for an intelligent, informed 
choice and eliminates the fear that the employer will cheat the employee out 
of the potentially more lucrative federal and state courts.
There are two main flaws with these arguments. First, most o f the 
critics’ arguments against mandatory arbitration remain unaddressed if  the 
system is voluntary. Specifically, the following arguments would not be 
remedied: (1) arbitration does not allow for the development of the law; (2) 
arbitration will adversely affect the EEOC’s ability to enforce the law; and
(3) arbitration is private and allows for little public accountability. 
Accordingly, it is simply inconsistent for critics to make these arguments 
and simultaneously support voluntary arbitration as a means for resolving 
employment disputes.
The second argument against voluntary arbitration is perhaps more
131. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that mandatory 
arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA except for employees in the transportation 
industry).
132. See supra notes 9-16.
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persuasive: Lawyers have not and will not use the system enough fo r  it to 
help solve the problems associated with the current system.
What follows is an examination of the viability o f post-dispute 
voluntary arbitration systems. To analyze such systems we first scrutinize 
the factors that motivate discrimination lawyers to select which clients to 
represent and which cases to pursue. As already mentioned, such an 
analysis is critical to evaluate voluntary arbitration as a substitute for 
mandatory arbitration. Parties’ amenability to agree voluntarily to arbitrate 
a pre-existing claim entirely depends on whether doing so conforms with 
their case-management strategies and ultimate case-resolution goals.
With the basic explanation o f the attorneys’ incentives and case- 
management strategies in mind, the Article then reports the results of a 
survey conducted regarding the preferences of arbitration among lawyers 
who specialize in employment law. Next, the Article reports the results of 
two different tests concerning lawyers’ propensities to select arbitration as a 
forum for resolving disputes. The first test is an analysis of lawyers’ 
responses to hypothetical situations. The second is an examination of what 
actually occurred when a post-dispute arbitration system was in place. A 
careful analysis of all of the above clearly supports the proposition that 
when given the option to select arbitration as a means to resolve disputes 
after a claim has arisen, in the vast majority of cases parties have not 
selected it, will not select it, and probably should not select it.
This conclusion begs two questions: (1) how can the author and a 
handful o f other advocates o f mandatory arbitration of employment disputes 
contend that such a form o f dispute resolution is fair to all parties if, in fact, 
most o f the time parties do not and should not select arbitration voluntarily 
after a dispute has arisen and the parties have more information about their 
cases; and (2) how can critics of mandatory arbitration advocate 
implementation of a system that no one uses? The Article concludes by 
answering the first question and setting forth a hypothesis regarding the 
second.
V.
T h e  C a s e  A g a i n s t  P o s t -D i s p u t e  V o l u n t a r y  a r b i t r a t i o n
A. When Attorneys Should Select Arbitration
Professor Samuel Estreicher contends that post-dispute voluntary 
arbitration will have no real effect on the employment discrimination 
docket.133 His hypothesis pivots on two premises. First, private practice 
lawyers, not their clients, ultimately decide which forum to select after an
133. See Estreicher, Saturns fo r  Rickshaws, supra note 20, at 566-67 n.20.
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employment dispute has arisen. Second, these lawyers act strategically and 
will only choose an alternate forum if they believe that such a decision will 
increase their chances o f a successful resolution.134 Professor Estreicher 
argues that in nearly all cases either one or both parties will believe that 
arbitration will lessen their side’s chances o f obtaining the desired 
resolution in terms of the amount of the damage award or an unfavorable 
ruling.135 Accordingly, there will be few, if  any, cases where both sides will 
choose arbitration.
Professor Estreicher predicates his theories on a straightforward and 
fairly narrow set of circumstances. He posits that in a termination case, 
management will not voluntarily offer arbitration if the employee has not 
obtained counsel. In these cases, it is not in the employer’s best interest to 
offer an adjudication process featuring relaxed procedural rules and lower 
costs. Instead, an employer is better off letting the case languish pending an 
agency’s review or dismissed by a court that may get frustrated with the pro  
se plaintiff not versed in the minutia of the procedures that judges often 
require. If, however, an employee-plaintiff obtains counsel, Professor 
Estreicher contends that the plaintiff’s lawyer will almost never voluntarily 
select arbitration because reducing the potential costs of defense reduces the 
case’s settlement value.136
Professor Estreicher’s theories and conclusion are both logical and 
realistic. In this section, the authors bolsters his conclusion that parties will 
only rarely agree to arbitrate employment disputes after a claim has been 
filed by examining how lawyers manage their cases, comparing and 
contrasting the relevant features of arbitration and litigation, and reporting 
the results o f the authors’ survey, which explains how lawyers perceive the 
differences between the two forums and how these differences affect 
lawyers’ decisions.
B. How Plaintiffs ’ Lawyers Choose Cases
I am aware of no academic studies that analyze how plaintiffs’ lawyers 
manage their employment law-related caseloads. Professor Herbert Kritzer, 
however, has done extensive work on how plaintiffs’ lawyers, working on a 
contingency fee arrangement, choose and manage their personal injury 
practices.137 While there are some important differences between the two
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
1 3 7 . H e r b e r t  m .  K r i t z e r ,  R h e t o r i c  a n d  R e a l i t y .  . . U s e s  a n d  A b u s e s .  . . C o n t i n g e n c i e s  
a n d  C e r t a i n t i e s :  T h e  A m e r i c a n  C o n t i n g e n t  F e e  in  O p e r a t i o n  ? (Inst, for Legal Studies, Working 
Paper No. DPRP 12-2, 1996) [hereinafter, K r i t z e r ,  R h e t o r i c  a n d  R e a l i t y ] ;  Herbert M. Kritzer, 
Investing in Cases: Can You Profit from  Contingency Fee Work?, WlS. LAW., Aug. 1997, at 89; Herbert 
M. Kritzer, Contingent Fee Lawyers and Contingent Fee Cases, at
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types of practices, Kritzer’s basic findings should apply to discrimination 
cases.
According to Kritzer, excluding a handful of outliers, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers are rational actors in that they only take cases they believe to be 
profitable. O f course, profitability is relative because a determination of 
what is profitable is based in large part on an attorney’s opportunity costs. 
To effectively manage their practices, Kritzer contends that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers treat their case loads as if they were financial portfolios with the 
rather monochromatic ultimate goal o f achieving a high return.138 Kritzer 
defines the return as the “effective hourly rate.” 139 The effective hourly rate 
is simply the attorney’s fee divided by the hours that the lawyer works on a 
case. Some cases, o f course, yield no return. To ensure a marginally 
acceptable effective hourly rate, the profitable cases must subsidize those 
that result in little or no compensation. To do this, plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
acting to maximize their hourly effective rate, must make critical economic 
decisions at no less than three junctions in the life of every case they 
consider accepting: (1) the outset (determining whether the case initially 
appears profitable), (2) the settlement negotiations (determining what the 
attorney’s bottom-line is) and (3) the decision to litigate (determining if  the 
case is worth pursuing after considering the costs o f expert witnesses, 
preparation and opportunity costs after discovery is completed).140
The best way for a plaintiffs’ law firm to maximize its collective 
effective hourly rate is to settle as many cases as possible while minimizing 
the amount of time spent on any matter. This is true even if the settlement 
figure is but a fraction o f the full damages the plaintiff could, or even would 
have received if a case had been fully litigated. This concept is best 
illustrated by the following hypothetical situation:
An employer terminates a $100,000 per year employee from his job in 
violation o f Title VII. In spite of the employee’s wholehearted attempts to 
find another job similar to the one he lost, he cannot find one for a whole 
year. The employee is therefore rightly entitled to back pay in the amount 
of $100,000. The employee easily finds a lawyer who agrees to take his 
case on contingency, thirty-three percent of the employee’s settlement 
before trial, and thirty-five percent o f whatever a judge or jury awards him. 
The employee’s lawyer writes the employer a letter sternly requesting 
reimbursement of the lost wages for the year. The employer responds with 
an offer to pay off the ex-employee for what might be considered a 
“nuisance” settlement offer o f only $30,000. The employee’s lawyer, who
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/users/kritzer/research/research.htm#contfee (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
138. See KRITZER, RHETORIC a n d  REALITY, supra note 137, at 89.
139. See id.
140. Telephone conversation with Zev J. Eigen, Associate at Littler Mendelson (Feb. 13, 2002).
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at most, spent five hours working on the case, sees this offer as a windfall 
because the fee, a mere $10,000, would mean the lawyer earned $2,000 per 
hour. Under Kritzer’s theory, $2,000 per hour is a more than acceptable 
effective hourly rate and thus, it likely makes sense to settle the case.141
The economic incentives of a plaintiffs’ lawyer often, however, 
conflict with the client’s best interests. In the above hypothetical situation 
for instance, the plaintiff might not be satisfied with a $20,000 award (after 
the lawyer’s fee) that taxes and withholdings will further reduce. The 
plaintiff may not wish to settle for anything less than $100,000 after he 
reads his attorney’s letter to his ex-employer waxing poetic on how much 
the employer might have to pay on top o f the $100,000 in the form of 
punitive damages and costs of defense including discovery, expert 
witnesses, and their own attorneys’ fees. This does not even include 
plaintiffs attorney’s fees if the employer loses. Moreover, the employee 
may seek vindication and wish to litigate regardless o f the risks and lost 
time.
Obviously, plaintiffs are not concerned with their lawyers’ returns on 
their cases and instead, want the highest settlement or judgment. 
Sometimes plaintiffs are not the rational actors that their attorneys are 
because plaintiffs sometimes want to go to trial regardless. Whereas 
plaintiffs’ attorneys strive to minimize the time spent on resolving their 
clients’ cases, their clients want their lawyers to devote as much attention to 
their cases as possible. This conflict presents a problem for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys. Assuming that the hypothetical case outlined above was litigated 
before a jury, the firm representing the employee would likely expend at 
least 500 attomey-hours to prepare for and litigate the case.142 The best case 
scenario for the plaintiffs lawyer in this case would be that the plaintiff 
would prevail, the jury would award full back pay and the statutory 
maximum of $300,000 (a combination of punitive and compensatory 
damages), the court would accept all of the firm’s 500 hours, award the 
lawyer $200 per hour in fees, and the lawyer would receive 35% of the 
plaintiffs award. If all of these “positives” for the plaintiffs law firm 
occurred, the firm’s collective effective hourly rate would be a mere $480. 
This represents a best-case scenario for the plaintiffs law firm. It could 
take more hours to prepare and litigate, the court could reduce the number 
of hours, the court could assign a lower hourly rate, the jury could refuse to 
award punitive damages, the jury could award a figure less than full back 
pay, or the plaintiff could lose, which is certainly the worst case scenario.
141. O f course the attorney may want to take a chance on winning the big payoff that could arise 
out o f  litigation. This would make sense only if  the lawyer is extremely confident in the case and the 
lawyer does not have other work that could yield a better hourly rate.
142. 500 hours is a conservative estimate according to David Ritter, Chair o f  the Labor and 
Employment Department at the Chicago law firm o f Altheimer and Gray. See supra note 88.
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If any of these events occurred, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would receive a lower 
effective hourly rate, or nothing at all. Clearly then, the attorney’s 
economic incentives fall in stark contrast to the plaintiffs whose main 
concern may be merely to win.
C. How Defense Lawyers Select Their Clients
Employment law defense practices typically differ fundamentally from 
plaintiffs’. Defense lawyers do not consider their queue of ongoing cases as 
a portfolio o f stock picks with varying degrees o f risk and potential to 
generate revenue. All o f defense-side law firm’s active cases generate 
revenue because these firms bill by the hour and are paid regardless of 
whether they win or lose. Defense firms therefore do not need to screen out 
cases that may not be successful on the merits. They take and pursue all 
cases because their clients pay them an hourly rate to defend them, win or 
lose.
Management firms’ priorities are also different than those of plaintiffs’ 
firms. Instead of attempting to maximize the dollar return on each 
individual case, management law firms strive to ensure their clients’ 
satisfaction with their work. This result is attributable to pure economic 
incentives, not to any moral or ethical superiority intrinsic to defense-side 
representation. The reality is that while most plaintiffs will not need the 
services of a plaintiff-side lawyer more than once, management-side clients 
will need employment law services in the future and their lawyers are 
always motivated by the prospect o f future business. As a result, 
management lawyers primarily concern themselves with two things: (1) 
ensuring that their clients do not seek other counsel in the future, and (2) 
convincing current clients to give them more work.143 Thus, not only do 
management-side law firms not need to maximize their return on any given 
case, but also they will view cases that will not generate substantial fees as 
positive if  those cases will likely lead to more work in the future.
This does not mean that firms that represent management invariably 
share the economic incentives o f their clients. In fact, often they do not. 
Employers typically encourage their lawyers to minimize their fees. While 
lawyers seeking to retain clients are very concerned about costs, they 
obviously need to generate fees in order to prosper. Resolving a case before 
the firm has put any real time into the matter will always generate less fees 
then litigating it to verdict or even summary judgment. Thus, putting 
securing prospects for future work aside, what is best for the client is not 
necessarily always best for the law firm.
The relationship between the management law firm and its clients
143. Conversation with Zev Eigen, supra note 140.
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becomes more complex when one considers the question of winning and 
losing. At first, many clients are against settling a case, as a matter of 
principle, when they believe that their company has not violated the law. 
Such noble sentiments may create a dilemma for the defense lawyer. On 
the one hand, the defense attorney does not want to appear weak and is 
encouraged by the prospect of earning substantial fees; conversely, the 
client may shed its honorable principles when the legal bills begin to 
accumulate and the risk of loss, especially in a jurisdiction believed to be 
extremely pro-employee, looms heavily. The defense lawyer is well aware 
that one o f the easiest ways to lose a client is to lose a case that could have 
been settled for the cost of defense or less.
D. The Decision to Arbitrate Is Complex
Because of the incentives explained above, it is clear that lawyers on 
both sides of the discrimination bar often face complex decisions regarding 
how to proceed with their cases. Whether to agree to arbitrate instead of 
litigate is yet another decision that lawyers sometimes consider. O f course, 
at least marginally, lawyers will make choices that they believe increase the 
odds o f achieving their goals, namely, maximizing the “effective hourly 
rate” for plaintiffs’ lawyers, and ensuring future work by pleasing clients 
for defense attorneys.
Both plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers approach the decision whether to 
arbitrate a claim on a case-by-case basis and on several levels. In 
particular, the parties must decide whether they foresee their optimal chance 
of achieving their desired result arising out o f settlement, adjudication by 
motion, or adjudication after a full evidentiary hearing. After making that 
decision, the lawyers must then decide which forum will likely offer the 
best chance for success given the type of resolution they seek. The 
“decision tree” is complex because o f the different features that each forum 
offers and the conflicting incentives discussed above.
For example, assume a management lawyer believes her best chance of 
success is through a motion for summary judgment and her worst chance at 
success would be at the mercy (or lack thereof) of a jury. Should she risk 
the chance of a jury trial by refusing to arbitrate or give up the chance to 
prevail at summary judgment in exchange for having an arbitrator instead of 
a jury decide the case? O f course, each of these decisions will be made on a 
case-by-case basis, and it would therefore be an exercise in futility to 
equivocally prognosticate what lawyers will do in any situation.
More appropriately, 1 assess what lawyers are likely to consider in 
deciding which forum to select. In fact, this is desirable because it may 
allow us to understand whether lawyers, in the aggregate, are likely to agree 
to arbitrate claims after they are filed. Specifically, one would expect that 
lawyers would focus on the fact that federal or state court litigation (1)
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provides for summary judgment motions, (2) allows for access to juries, (3) 
is public rather than private, (4) has an accessible appeals system, and (5) is 
often cumbersome and expensive. In contrast, arbitration generally (1) does 
not provide for summary judgment motions, (2) does not provide access to 
juries, (3) is private, (4) offers only extremely limited appeals, and (5) is 
significantly faster and less expensive than litigating a case to verdict.144 In 
order for a post-dispute voluntary arbitration system to work, both the 
plaintiffs and the defense lawyer need to conclude that arbitration’s 
benefits outweigh its costs and that arbitration represents the best chance for 
success for each lawyer.
As this article ultimately concludes, however, this rarely occurs. 
Invariably, what is advantageous to one side is disadvantageous to the 
other. Attorneys are hesitant to take any action that could signal weakness 
to the other side or hinder his or her chances of obtaining a desirable 
outcome. Parties are wise to consider not only the technical advantages and 
disadvantages of arbitration, but also the psychological effects of 
suggesting (or agreeing voluntarily to) an alternative forum. It may be the 
case that parties are reluctant to offer to arbitrate when either the underlying 
facts o f their case appear weak or the opposition aggressively postures its 
willingness and readiness to proceed to trial.
To illustrate how one side’s tactical advantage is the other side’s 
strategic nightmare, consider the determination attorneys must render o f the 
amenability o f the facts of a case to being dismissed on a motion. 
Particularly, attorneys evaluate whether there are favorable issues of law 
supported by undisputed facts that could constitute grounds for a successful 
motion. If  such factors exist, a defendant will theoretically be less inclined 
to agree to arbitrate. It stands to reason that the stronger the basis for a 
defendant’s pre-trial motion, the less likely it is that a defendant will agree 
to arbitrate and the more likely plaintiff will agree to arbitrate. The 
converse of these two statements logically follows: the weaker the basis for 
a defendant’s dispositive pre-trial motion, the more likely it is that the 
defendant will agree to arbitrate and the less likely it is that a plaintiff will 
agree to arbitrate. Assuming that both defendants and plaintiffs are 
relatively competent assessors o f the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
their respective cases and  that both sides have sufficient access to 
information to render relatively informed decisions, theoretically, there 
would be only rarely, if  ever, an instance in which both sides would 
simultaneously agree to arbitrate their claims after a lawsuit is filed.
To further illustrate how attorneys’ decision-making processes yield
144. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role o f  Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 92 
(2001) (noting that a defense before a jury may cost an employer S100,000 to $200,000 even if  
successful).
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few, if  any, instances o f agreement to submit pre-existing claims to 
arbitration, this article reports, below, the preliminary results o f a survey 
that explores lawyers’ perceptions o f arbitration and how those perceptions 
affect lawyers’ decisions.
VI.
E m p ir ic a l  E v i d e n c e
To better understand the likelihood of both parties independently 
agreeing to arbitrate, I closely scrutinize each party’s views about 
arbitration and its alternatives. To test the empirical accuracy of the 
arguments regarding voluntary arbitration outlined above, I draw on survey 
data from practicing Chicago employment lawyers as well as caseload data 
from the Illinois Human Rights Commission. My survey data provides a 
glimpse into practicing employment attorneys’ opinions on arbitration as 
well as how their opinions influence their decisions regarding voluntary 
arbitration. In the first part o f this section, I report findings from the 
collected survey data. Next, I report the results o f complementary data, 
drawn from approximately 1,300 cases filed with the Illinois Human Rights 
Commission’s (IHRC). The IHRC operated a voluntary arbitration 
program from 1994 through 1998, which provides valuable information on 
parties’ actual arbitration practices.
A. Survey Data
1. Background and Methodology
One critical step towards understanding how lawyers perceive and use 
voluntary arbitration procedures involves gaining a clearer understanding of 
the lawyers who have the occasion to use such dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Among the obvious sub-groups of attorneys inclined to use 
the IHRC procedure was Chicago’s Employment Bar. Although I have no 
reason to believe that Chicago’s employment attorneys are any more or less 
representative o f employment attorneys practicing in other large 
metropolitan areas, they have the distinct attribute of practicing in a 
jurisdiction that had a voluntary arbitration alternative systematically 
available to them.
It is not easy to demarcate the sub-group of attorneys who specialize in 
employment law, or the side they represent. Although no firm “list” defines 
the entire universe of employment attorneys, one helpful proxy is attorney 
self-reports of practice areas. Specifically, a common practice for attorneys 
engaged in employment matters (as well as other sub-specialties) is to
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identify their practice areas in the Martindale-Hubbell directory.145 Indeed, 
Martindale-Hubbell now posts its attorney lists on-line146 and, consequently, 
facilitates the development o f survey mailing lists. I developed my initial 
universe of Chicago employment attorneys from the Martindale-Hubbell 
directory (N= 1187). I surveyed each attorney listed and subsequently 
reduced the sample by the number of attorneys listed whose survey was 
undelivered or returned due to a wrong address and who could not be 
contacted with subsequent phone calls. Finally, I also removed from the 
sample those attorneys who responded to the survey but clearly indicated 
that they were no longer (or never had been) active in the Employment Bar. 
Such filtering further reduced the sample size to N=938. O f the 938 
eligible respondents, 288 returned the surveys for a response rate of 31%.147
To glean insight into how defense and plaintiff employment lawyers 
might approach issues germane to voluntary arbitration differently, I 
divided the sample into two sub-groups: defense (N=247) and plaintiff 
(N=41) employment lawyers. Those in the defense lawyers group are those 
who reported that at least 51 percent of their employment law practice 
involves representing defendants. Conversely, those attorneys in the 
plaintiff group are those who report that less than 51 percent of their 
employment law practice involves representing defendants. Tables 1A and 
IB present summary and descriptive information on the sample.
What is clear from Tables 1A and IB is that the two groups of lawyers 
share many traits. For example, both groups are roughly equivalent in 
terms o f experience (years in practice). Moreover, the two groups of 
employment lawyers possess remarkably similar background 
characteristics. Lawyers from both groups are, on average, in their mid- 
40s. Perhaps reflecting the Bar overall, most are both white and male. 
However, a much larger percentage of plaintiff lawyers are female (thirty- 
five percent versus twenty-one percent).
Despite sharing many traits, defense and plaintiff lawyers differ in 
important ways. Perhaps most important is how these differences bear on 
the likelihood of specialization. In terms of an overall percentage of their 
practice, more than one-half (51.3%) o f defense lawyers’ practice involves 
employment discrimination matters. For plaintiff lawyers, that figure is 
43.5%. This disparity may be greater than it seems because many of the 
defense lawyers fill the remainder of their practice with other labor and 
employment issues such as union management relations, fair labor 
standards act issues, training, and other related matters. For many of the
145. See Martindale-Hubbell, at http://www.martindale.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
146. Id.
147. In the analysis, I was unable to enter the full data contained in twenty surveys. I therefore 
used missing data techniques. For an overview o f these techniques, see generally RODERICK J. A . 
L it t l e , S t a t i s t i c a l  A n a l y s i s  w it h  M i s s i n g  D a t a  (1987).
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plaintiffs’ lawyers, the remainder of their practices involve non­
employment issues like personal injury law. Further, defense lawyers have 
argued more than fifty percent more cases than plaintiff lawyers before the 
IHRC.
Finally, law firm size148 might serve as yet another proxy, however 
crude, for law practice specialization. The single largest distinction 
between defense and plaintiff employment lawyers involves their respective 
law firm sizes. For defense lawyers the typical law firm size (211.9) is 
thirteen times larger than the typical plaintiff law firm (16.3). As I make 
clear in my discussion about the economic incentives that these two distinct 
groups o f lawyers confront,149 law firm size might also play some role in 
economic risk assessment. To be more specific, lawyers from larger law 
firms are likely to be better equipped to take on risky cases.
148. I construe law firm size in terms o f total number o f attorneys.
149. See supra note 137.
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T a b l e  1 A : S u m m a r y  S t a t is t ic s  (D e f e n s e  L a w y e r s )
Variable Mean SD
Years in Practice 17.5 9.9
% Pract. Employ. Disc. 51.0 30.2
Law Firm Size (# attny’s) 203.7 363.3.1
No. Cases Before IHRC 13.5 33.7
Age 44.1 9.8
M F
Gender (%) 80% 20%
W hite N on-W
Ethnic Origin (%) 91% 9%
N = 247
T a b l e  1b : S u m m a r y  S t a t is t ic s  (P l a in t if f  L a w y e r s )
Variable Mean SD
Years in Practice 17.1 8.8
% Pract. Employ. Disc. 43.6 28.3
Law Firm Size (# attny’s) 18.0 42.0
No. Cases Before IHRC 10.0 16.6
Age 44.0 9.0
M F
Gender (%) 63% 37%
W hite N on-W
Ethnic Origin (%) 90% 10%
N = 41
2. Opinions on Arbitration and Litigation
Results from the opinion survey illustrate why voluntary arbitration 
programs will likely stumble, at least in the employment context. As 
delineated in Table 2, the survey asked both plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers 
their opinions as to whether arbitrators, judges, and juries are: (1) more 
likely to give employees or employers their desired results; (2) better able 
to understand complex legal issues; and (3) better able to understand 
complex factual issues. As described in Table 3 below, the survey also 
asked how the lawyers’ responses reported in Table 2 would affect their 
decisions whether to arbitrate. Taken together, the means of the lawyers’ 
responses reveal that it is unlikely that there would be a significant number 
o f cases in which the lawyers on both sides o f a case would simultaneously 
agree to submit to voluntary arbitration.
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It is important to note that the results compiled herein reflect only the 
mean response to each question, not, of course, the exact response o f each 
participant. Therefore, the interpretation o f these results is what would 
occur on average. Indeed, because many respondents’ actual recorded 
answers varied from the mean, it is possible that in any individual case the 
exact opposite of what my survey predicts could occur. Such cases would, 
however, represent an unlikely departure from the norm when the results 
are statistically significant.
The survey also sought to examine the parties’ perceptions of 
favoritism on the part of arbitrators, judges, and juries. The attorneys’ 
responses further confirm that it would be unlikely for both sides to choose 
arbitration in a given case. For example, neither defense lawyers nor 
plaintiffs’ lawyers believe that arbitrators favor their clients. In fact, 
defense lawyers significantly disagree with the statement “arbitrators tend 
to favor employers” and plaintiffs’ lawyers significantly disagree with the 
statement “arbitrators tend to favor employees.” Moreover, both groups 
agree that arbitrators favor the other side. For the defense lawyers, this 
agreement is statistically significant. The fact that both sides believe that 
arbitrators do not favor their clients but favor the opposition offers 
convincing evidence o f parties’ general reluctance to select arbitration.150
Unlike their opinions about arbitrators, lawyers for both sides seem to 
agree on whom juries and federal judges favor. Both sides believe that 
juries favor employees and that judges favor employers. Both of these 
beliefs achieve statistical significance for plaintiff and defense side 
attorneys, but none differ significantly from those of the other side. Thus, 
lawyers from both sides tend to agree that a plaintiff-employee is better off 
in front o f a jury and that a defendant-employer is better off in front of 
judge. Accordingly, because plaintiffs’ lawyers believe that arbitrators 
favor employers, one would expect that a plaintiff would rarely select 
arbitration voluntarily. One could argue that employers, working hard to 
avoid a jury may choose to arbitrate even though they believe that the 
arbitrators favor plaintiffs because these lawyers believe that juries are more 
biased than arbitrators. But, of course, it takes two to arbitrate voluntarily.
Our complex litigation system, however, eludes simplified analyses. 
Because defendant-employers will rarely, if  ever, be fortuitous enough to 
encounter a plaintiff who agrees to a bench trial,151 the only opportunity that
150. Examining the distribution o f the respondents, only 19 o f the 229 defense attorneys believed 
that arbitrators favored employers (i.e. answered with a 5, 6, or 7 to the question). Similarly, only 5 o f  
the plaintiffs’ lawyers believed that arbitrators favored employees. If these distributions are 
representative o f all discrimination lawyers, we would expect only 1% o f the cases to have lawyers on 
both sides who believe that arbitrators favor their clients.
151. In some jurisdictions, however, plaintiffs lose their right to a jury trial if  they fail to request 
one within a given time period. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4102(a) (requiring parties to demand jury trial 
within fifteen days o f  receiving a note o f  issue waiving trial by jury).
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may exist for a defendant-employer to have its case resolved by a judge is 
on a motion. According to my survey, lawyers believe that dispositive 
motions tend to favor employers.152 In fact, both defense and plaintiffs’ 
lawyers agree significantly that the general unavailability o f dispositive 
motions in arbitration is detrimental to employers but not for employees.
It is clear that if both sides had their respective ways, defendant- 
employers would have all lawsuits filed against them dismissed on pre-trial 
motions and plaintiff-employees would have every lawsuit they filed 
decided by juries. Litigation, however, gives neither party what they want. 
It is equally clear that juries do not hear the vast majority of employment 
law cases filed and that parties settle more employment lawsuits than are 
dismissed on motions.153 Therefore, traveling down the path towards court 
is rife with risks for both sides. If  a judge rejects a defendant’s motion, an 
employer risks facing a jury trial or being forced to settle the case for an 
inflated sum. Similarly, a plaintiff risks having his case dismissed on a 
motion instead o f being heard by a jury.
The risks inherent to litigation raise an important question: would an 
employer, afraid o f an employee-friendly jury, and an employee, afraid o f a 
judge eager to prune his overrun docket by granting dispositive motions, 
both voluntarily elect to arbitrate their claims despite the fact that each side 
believes that the arbitrator favors the opposition? We could support such a 
statement by citing the fact that my results reveal that while defense and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are both averse to letting arbitrators decide their cases, 
they are even more averse to having juries and judges, respectively, decide 
their cases. The counter to that argument is that the parties have indicated 
such a strong desire to let the adjudicator o f their choice decide the fate of 
their claims that plaintiffs would risk losing a motion and employers would
152. This is based on the survey’s finding that both sides agree significantly that judges tend to 
favor employers. Because more defendants file motions to dismiss than plaintiffs file motions for 
directed verdicts, it stands to reason that motion practice more often favors defendants, or at least 
lawyers perceive it as such.
153. See William J. Howard, Arbitrating Claims o f  Employment Discrimination , 50 J. DlSP. RESOL. 
40, 43-44 (1995). The researcher surveyed 321 members o f  the National Employment Lawyers 
Association and 330 members o f  the Section o f Labor and Employment Law o f  the American Bar 
Association. Employment law comprised at least 80% o f the respondents’ practices. Defense attorneys 
estimated that 79% o f their cases settled before adjudication and plaintiffs’ attorneys estimated that 84% 
o f their cases settled prior to final adjudication. But, high success rates for motions to dismiss filed by 
defendants do not necessarily mean that judges are employer-friendly. In fact, just the opposite may be 
true. Defense attorneys typically charge their clients by the hour. Many clients do not accept 
unnecessarily incurred costs and would certainly not endorse filing dispositive motions without 
reassurance o f  a minimum probability o f  success. Therefore, defense attorneys are reluctant to file 
motions and incur costs unnecessarily unless there is a strong chance o f  success. In jurisdictions in 
which the judges are notoriously pro-employee, the defense would only contemplate filing a motion if  it 
had a great likelihood of success. It stands to reason then, that in such jurisdictions, a greater success 
rate o f  dispositive motions could result despite the judges’ reputation for their staunch pro-employee 
views.
44 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LA W Vol. 24:1
risk facing a jury (or the prospect o f settling the case with the jury 
looming). More likely is the conclusion that the parties will seek to 
mitigate their respective risk by examining additional factors that could 
help or harm their cases.
A second set of survey questions sought to shed light on such 
additional factors by eliciting lawyers’ confidence levels regarding judges, 
juries, and arbitrators’ relative abilities as adjudicators o f employment-law 
related disputes. The results reveal a high degree o f agreement between 
plaintiff and defense lawyers in this area. It seems, however, that such 
agreement will likely lead to few if any post-dispute agreements to arbitrate. 
In fact, it is likely that such agreement would in fact result in few er  
incidents of defendants and plaintiffs concurrently consenting to arbitrating 
claims if the plaintiff files the case in federal court.
Both defense and plaintiff lawyers agree that arbitrators are better 
versed in the germane law than jurors. Indeed, both groups agree in a 
manner that significantly departs from the mid-point. However, the degree 
o f defense and plaintiff lawyers’ agreement varies with defense lawyers 
agreeing more strongly that arbitrators are better versed in the germane law 
than jurors. Defense and plaintiff lawyers’ agreement that arbitrators 
understand complex legal issues better than jurors comports with related 
opinions on jurors’ comparative abilities. Finally, in a manner that is not 
distinguishable, both groups o f lawyers disagree with the assertion that 
arbitrators understand complex legal issues better than judges.154
These responses indicate more factors lawyers employ when they 
decide whether to arbitrate employment matters. It seems logical that 
parties who believe that their cases ride on the true understanding of 
complex legal issues would seek a judge and try to avoid a jury or an 
arbitrator. The other side would, likely, seek the exact opposite. O f course 
both sides would choose to adjudicate their claims before a judge if  the 
parties each believed that an accurate passionless legal analysis would 
benefit them. I suggest, however, that, in most cases, veteran employment 
law practitioners understand whether the law, no matter how complex, 
supports their clients’ claims. Thus one side invariably favors judges over 
juries and arbitration while the other side seeks to avoid judges.
The findings presented in Table 2 support the argument that it will be 
very rare for both sides to concurrently choose arbitration because the 
parties see significant discrepancies in the relative biases and the different 
adjudicators’ skill sets and skill levels. These differences, I contend, should 
have a greater effect on the parties’ decisions about whether to submit to
154. This result seems to conflict with note 129 that discusses the qualifications that JAMS and 
AAA lawyers must satisfy. One explanation is that many o f  the surveyed lawyers have experience with 
labor arbitration. There is wide variability in labor arbitrations.
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arbitration than the fact that arbitration is faster and less expensive than 
litigation. In fact, if arbitration’s speed and reduced costs have any effect 
on the parties’ decision making process, the effect would more likely 
reduce the likelihood of consensus between the parties to arbitrate after a 
dispute arises because either party may find itself in a position in which it 
would be advantageous to exploit the high costs and systemic delays 
intrinsic to litigation. Still, in order to meaningfully evaluate the effects of 
the differences (perceived or real) between judges, juries, and arbitrators on 
parties’ decisions o f which forum to select, I questioned employment 
attorneys regarding the influences of each of the items described above on 
their decisions. The following section discusses the results in greater detail.
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Table 2
Opinions on Arbitration and Litigation
Defense
Lawyers
(N=247)
Plaintiff
Lawyers
(N=41)
Notes
Arbitrators tend to favor employees 4.18 3.24 1 ,2 ,3
(1.13) (1.28)
Arbitrators tend to favor employers 3.44 4.31 1,2
(0.99) (1.45)
Arbitrators Tend to “split the baby” and 1 would not 4.80 4.39 2
get what 1 want (1.57) (1.76)
Juries more likely than arbitrators to provide 2.91 3.02 2 ,3
employers desired result (1.38) (1.41)
Administrative Law Judges are more likely than 3.60 3.76 2
arbitrators to provide employers desired result (1.26) (1.16)
Fed. judges more likely than arbitrators to provide 5.14 5.48 2 ,3
employers desired result (1.35) (1.23)
Arbitrators are better versed in law than juries 5.51 5.10 2 ,3
(1.27) (1.61)
Arbitrators are better versed in law than Federal 2.13 2.63 1 ,2 ,3
judges (1.25) (1.46)
Arbitrators understand complex legal issues better 5.33 4.59 1 ,2 ,3
than juries (1.20) (1.61)
Arbitrators understand complex legal issues better 2.24 2.53 2 ,3
than Federal judges (1.10) (1.28)
Lack o f  dispositive motions compromises 5.24 4.53 1 ,2 ,3
employer’s case (1.65) (1.62)
Notes: Respondents asked to rate the extent to which the following opinions might influence their
decision to arbitrate (l=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree). Standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses.
1. Defense lawyers’ responses significantly different from that o f  the plaintiff lawyers at p < .05
2. Defense lawyers’ responses significantly different from the midpoint, 4.0, at p <  .05.
3. Plaintiff Lawyers’ responses significantly different from the midpoint, 4.0, at p < .05.
3. Influence o f  Employment Attorneys ’ Opinions on the Decision to 
Arbitrate
It is one thing to learn about attorneys’ opinions on arbitrators; it is 
quite another to gauge whether their opinions influence their decisions to 
agree to post-dispute voluntary arbitration. Table 3 presents the survey 
results on whether attorneys’ opinions compiled in Table 2 influence
2003 BECA USE IT  TAKES TWO Al
parties’ decisions to arbitrate.155 The results demonstrate, not surprisingly, 
that the factors which generated significant departures from the mid-point in 
Table 2 (that is, the responses that generated strong agreement or strong 
disagreement) carried the most influence on lawyers’ decisions.
To measure the influence of the items reported in Table 2 on lawyers’ 
decisions to arbitrate, the author polled the practitioners on how these 
factors influenced their decisions.156 The survey reveals that the greatest 
influences on parties’ decisions whether to arbitrate are the lack of 
dispositive motions and the perceptions o f adjudicator bias.
As reported in Table 2, both plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers agree that 
the lack o f dispositive motions compromises employer but not employee 
claims. Not surprisingly, when asked about the influence o f the lack of 
motions on their decisions, the response o f defense lawyers (the group 
whose cases would be compromised) depart significantly from the mid­
point and also from that o f plaintiffs. Based on the results reported in Table 
2, the general unavailability o f dispositive motions before arbitrators 
significantly influences employers not to accept offers to arbitrate but has 
no real influence on plaintiffs’ decisions to accept offers to arbitrate. Thus, 
if  dispositive motions were the only influence on lawyers, it is unlikely that 
there would ever be any post-dispute voluntary arbitrations because defense 
lawyers would never choose this form of adjudication. O f course, there is 
at least one other major influence on the parties’ decision.
Both defense and plaintiffs’ lawyers’ decisions to arbitrate were 
significantly influenced by the question o f who would adjudicate their 
claims. The fact that a jury would otherwise decide a pending case 
significantly influences defense lawyers to agree to arbitrate and plaintiffs’ 
lawyers not to agree to arbitrate. Conversely, the fact that a judge would 
not decide the case significantly influences defense lawyers to agree to 
arbitrate and plaintiffs not to agree to arbitrate.
The results uncover an interesting set o f conditions. The lawyers’ 
beliefs about the biases of judges tend to lead defense lawyers to refuse to 
arbitrate, but plaintiffs’ lawyers to agree to arbitrate. On the other hand 
their beliefs regarding the biases o f juries lead defense lawyers to select 
arbitration and plaintiffs’ lawyers to refuse arbitration. Finally, the defense 
lawyers’ reliance on dispositive motions influences employers not to
155. For this question, the survey asked respondents to score questions on a seven-point scale 
where 1 indicated very little influence and 7 indicated a strong influence.
156. The survey used a seven-point scale with 1 meaning very little influence and 7 meaning a 
strong influence. It is possible to contend that any score over 1 represents some influence and that a 
score o f  five would be great influence. However, based on the fact that the previous scale was also a 
seven point scale with 4 as a mid-point, I am taking a much more conservative approach and reporting 
the results as if  4 represented a score o f  no real influence. Again this is a conservative interpretation 
that, at worst underestimates the influences o f the items and, at best, represents the intent o f  the 
participants.
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arbitrate, but has no real effect on employees. Unfortunately for those who 
offer post-dispute voluntary arbitration as a compromise to the mandatory 
pre-dispute variety, there are no factors that harmoniously influence both 
parties to elect arbitration. However, there is at least one factor that 
influences both sides not to agree to arbitrate: their shared beliefs about 
arbitrator bias. Table 2 indicates that both plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers 
believe that arbitrators favor the other side. Table 3 shows that this belief 
significantly influences both sides not to arbitrate.
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Table 3
Influence of Opinions on Decision to Arbitrate
Defense
Lawyers
(N=247)
Plaintiff
Lawyers
(N=41)
Notes
Arbitrators’ tendency to “split the baby” 4.92 4.50 2
(1.50) (1.53)
Arbitrators’ limited discovery on settlement 3.94 4.10
(1.66) (1.80)
Arbitrators’ lack o f dispositive motions on the 5.05 4.00 1,2
case (1.65) (1.84)
Arbitrators’ tendency to favor employers or 4.54 4.87 2 ,3
employees (1.61) (1.81)
Administrative Law Judges’ tendency to favor 4.34 4.20 2
employers or employees (1.59) (1.57)
Juries’ tendency to favor employers or 5.66 5.41 2 ,3
employees (1.34) (1.69)
Federal judges’ tendency to favor employers or 4.28 4.98 1 ,2 ,3
employees (1.80) (1.89)
Arbitrators’ will decide case instead o f  a jury 5.44 5.22 2 ,3
(1.41) (1.78)
Arbitrators’ will decide case instead o f an 4.42 4.29 2
Administrative Law Judge (1.44) (1.68)
Arbitrators’ will decide case instead o f  a Federal 4.72 4.92 2 ,3
Judge (1.79) (1.69)
Notes: Respondents asked to rate the extent to which the following opinions might influence their 
decision to arbitrate (l=very little influence; 7=strong influence). Standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses.
1. Defense lawyers’ responses significantly different from that o f  the plaintiff lawyers at p < .05.
2. Defense lawyers’ responses significantly different from the midpoint, 4.0, at p < .05.
3. Plaintiff Lawyers’ responses significantly different from the midpoint, 4.0, at p < .05.
4. Scenarios
The final part of the three-part survey involves gauging employment 
attorneys’ responses to three composite scenarios. In these scenarios, the 
author stylized fact patterns to portray three common employment law 
situations. Scenario One involves the classic “he said, she said” situation 
without the benefit o f third-party witnesses. In a “he said, she said” case, it 
is extremely unlikely that the court will grant a dispositive motion. The 
facts in Scenario Two endeavor to lead respondents to emotionally favor the
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employee even though a strict and passionless legal analysis clearly favors 
the employer. In this scenario, a dispositive motion is unlikely, but 
possible. In the Third Scenario, the facts and the law support the employer 
so heavily that a judge would very likely grant a dispositive motion.
The survey asks the responding lawyers to rate the likelihood of: (1) 
the case being settled; (2) the case being successfully adjudicated; and (3) 
the case being successfully resolved (either through adjudication or 
settlement) if an arbitrator, a federal court judge, a jury, or an IHRC 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) decided the case. The survey also asks 
the lawyers to evaluate which of the adjudication processes would most 
likely lead to their desired outcome and if they would voluntarily choose 
arbitration to resolve the dispute. I compiled results from questions relating 
to each scenario in Table 4.
Before examining the responses specific to each scenario, recall again 
the basic principle o f voluntary arbitration: both parties must agree to 
participate— it takes two to arbitrate. Put slightly differently, the decision 
of either party not to participate will preclude even the most zealous 
proponent of voluntary arbitration from arbitrating a dispute. Three 
findings bear directly on this simple but crucial point.
First, for disputes filed in federal court, defense lawyers in all instances 
reported that it is less than likely that they would agree to arbitrate. In 
Scenarios Two and Three these responses were significant. Conversely, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, who reported they were less than likely to arbitrate in 
Scenario One, stated they were more than likely to agree to arbitrate in 
Scenarios Two and Three. None o f these responses, however, were 
significant. Accordingly, there was not one scenario in which both the 
defense and plaintiff lawyers agree, on average, that voluntary arbitration is 
more likely than not to occur for a federal court case.
Second, defense lawyers report a better chance o f a successful 
resolution in each scenario if the parties litigate the case in federal court as 
opposed to arbitration. Each of these findings is significant. Plaintiffs, on 
the other hand, believe they will have a better chance for success in 
arbitration than in federal court for each scenario. None o f these findings, 
however, are significant.
Third, the results demonstrate what could be a particular aversion to 
litigating before the IHRC. Both groups o f lawyers in all three scenarios 
predict that the likelihood for arbitration is more likely than not when the 
alternative is resolution by the IHRC. Interestingly, this result remains 
constant even in instances in which the parties perceive that they have better 
than even prospects for success before the IHRC.
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a. Scenario One
Scenario One involves the classic “he said, she said” factual situation 
in which proof pivots on the perceived persuasiveness o f the claimant 
versus that of the employer (or employer’s agent) because little or no other 
corroborating evidence exists. Because this is clearly a question of fact, 
summary judgment should not be available.
1. Chances o f  Settlement
Defense lawyers reported that settlement was the outcome more likely 
than not to result in all three contexts, federal court, the IHRC, and 
arbitration. Not surprisingly, defense attorneys’ responses indicated that 
they are most certain that cases litigated in federal court will result in 
settlement, perhaps due to the reoccurring acute aversion to juries and the 
difficult issues o f proof inherent to “he said, she said” cases. Each o f these 
responses was significant. Likewise, plaintiff lawyers’ responses indicated 
that they believed, with significance, that settlement is the outcome more 
likely than not to result for cases litigated in federal court. For cases 
pending before the IHRC or in arbitration, however, plaintiffs reported they 
were less than likely to settle. Neither of these results was significant. 
Both sides reported that the chances o f settlement were lowest if  they were 
to arbitrate the case. In fact, the difference in the likelihood of settlement 
between arbitration and both federal court and the IHRC were significant 
for defense lawyers. For plaintiffs, the difference between the likelihood of 
settlement was significant between arbitration and federal court. Based on 
this result, one may logically conclude that once the parties agree to 
arbitrate a case, settlement prospects become less likely.
2. Perceived Chances o f  Successful Adjudication
Under the facts o f Scenario One, the survey questions regarding 
attorneys’ estimations o f their prospects for receiving a favorable ruling or 
result by an ALJ, a federal judge, a jury, and an arbitrator yielded some 
surprising results. As expected, defense lawyers reported that their 
slimmest chances for receiving a favorable decision in the “he said, she 
said” case was if  a jury decided it. As expected, though, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
projected that their best chance o f success was if a jury decided the case. It 
is worthwhile to note, though, that both groups regard the adjudicator as the 
key to success or lack thereof. Management lawyers believe they will 
prevail in front o f a judge, but lose if a jury, an ALJ, or an arbitrator decides 
their case. Each o f these beliefs is significant except in the case of 
arbitration. Plaintiffs’ lawyers believe they will prevail in front of a jury
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and an arbitrator, but lose if a federal court judge or an ALJ decides the 
case. Only the belief about success in front of a jury is, however, 
significant.
3. Likelihood o f  Successful Resolution (Either via Adjudication or 
Settlement) and Probability o f  Agreement to Arbitrate
The last two questions that I asked are the most pointed and provide 
the most interesting results. The survey asked the lawyers to rate: (1) their 
likelihood of successfully resolving the case (either by obtaining an award 
in their favor or by negotiating a favorable settlement) if it was litigated in 
federal court, before the IHRC, or if  the parties arbitrated it; and (2) the 
probability of them choosing to arbitrate this “he said, she said” case if the 
parties were to litigate the case in federal court or before the IHRC. The 
defense lawyers’ reported scores for “likelihood of a successful resolution 
(adjudicated or settlement) if the case were to be arbitrated” 157 was 
significantly below the mid-point, while plaintiffs scores were slightly, but 
not significantly, above the mid-point. The scores, 3.77 for defense lawyers 
and 4.05 for plaintiffs’ lawyers, do not significantly depart from each other. 
Based on this report, one would logically expect that the parties would 
choose to arbitrate only if they believed their chances for success were 
significantly lower than the mid-point in one or both of the other two 
forums.
Management attorneys rated their chances of success before a federal 
court significantly above the mid-point at 4.24 and their chances for success 
before the IHRC significantly below the mid-point at 3.30. As expected, 
defense lawyers reported that they were significantly more likely to 
voluntarily agree to arbitrate a “he said, she said” case in front o f the IHRC 
with a score o f 4.65. They were unlikely to voluntarily agree to arbitrate if 
the plaintiff filed the same case in federal court. However, the defense 
lawyers’ aggregate response to the survey’s inquiry about parties’ 
likelihood of agreeing to arbitrate if the parties were to otherwise litigate the 
case in federal court, 3.96, was just slightly below the mid-point and not a 
significant divergence.
The plaintiffs’ lawyers reported that their chances in federal court and 
before the IHRC were both above the mid-point at 4.03 and 4.08 
respectively. In neither case, however, were the results significant. As 
expected, the plaintiffs’ lawyers stated that they were unlikely to arbitrate if 
the parties were to adjudicate the fact pattern set forth in Scenario One in 
federal court with a seemingly strong, but surprisingly insignificant, score 
of 3.63. This is the case because plaintiffs’ lawyers realize that a motion
157. I defined success to include adjudication or settlement.
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will not resolve this case and thus, they can either have a jury trial or use 
the prospects of a jury to force a settlement. Plaintiffs’ lawyers were, 
however, likely to arbitrate if  the plaintiff filed the case with the IHRC with 
a score of 4.40, which is insignificant from the mid-point.
These findings suggest that it is highly unlikely that both plaintiffs’ 
lawyers and defense lawyers will choose to arbitrate a “he said, she said” 
case if  the plaintiff files the action in federal court. This conclusion is 
derived from the following: (1) both parties’ scores on the ultimate question 
of “are you willing to agree to arbitrate” were below the mid-point; (2) 
defense lawyers rated their chances for success (either by adjudication or 
settlement) higher in federal court than in arbitration; and (3) both parties 
rated their chances o f a settlement (which parties usually desire) as higher 
in federal court.
This conclusion is not as clear-cut if  the IHRC were to hear the case 
because the results o f the survey are not as consistent. On the ultimate 
question o f whether the parties will agree to arbitrate, both sides’ aggregate 
responses were above the mid-point. Only the employers’ score, however, 
was significantly divergent. Defense lawyers rated their chances of success 
(via settlement or adjudication) as better in arbitration than before the 
IHRC. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, on the other hand, reported a lower score. It 
appears, therefore, that if  the parties were to adjudicate Scenario One, both 
sides agree that they have a better chance of prevailing if  the case were 
before an arbitrator as opposed to the IHRC. Both sides also agree, 
however, that a settlement is more likely if  this case is before the IHRC 
than before an arbitrator. Given this level o f inconsistency, one could 
conclude that post-dispute voluntary arbitration could potentially impact the 
IHRC’s docket in “he said, she said cases.” Alternatively, because both 
sides must simultaneously agree to arbitrate, it is equally likely that there 
will be little or no effect.
b. Scenario Two
The second scenario’s hypothetical facts are intended to evoke pro­
employee sympathy even though strict legal analysis decidedly favors the 
employer. While a dispositive motion is possible, it is not likely. The 
results reveal that defense lawyers are far more comfortable with this 
scenario than plaintiff lawyers.
1. Chances o f  Settlement
Under the facts of Scenario Two, defense lawyers estimated their 
chances for a successful resolution more favorably than plaintiff lawyers. 
Defense lawyers also reported a greater degree o f confidence in the
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prospect for settlement, regardless of the adjudication forum. Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers reported that their chances for settlement are somewhat less than 
likely in all three forums. The differences between the defense and plaintiff 
lawyers’ responses achieve statistical significance.
2. Perceived Chances o f  Successful Adjudication
Defense lawyers’ responses reflect optimism regarding their chances 
for successful adjudicative results under this scenario if  an arbitrator, a 
federal court judge, or an ALJ were to decide the case. Each o f the scores is 
a significant departure from the mid-point. Alternatively, defense lawyers 
report that success before a jury is less than likely with a score o f 3.82. 
While this score is not a significant departure from the mid-point, it is a 
significant departure from the scores for the other three adjudicators. The 
defense lawyers’ fear o f juries may explain their confidence in settling the 
case. One could conclude that defense lawyers will accept a settlement 
offer in this scenario to avoid any possibility o f a jury.
Plaintiff lawyers’ responses echoed defense lawyers’ assessment of the 
case. Plaintiffs’ lawyers feel that the prospects for their clients’ success are 
unlikely in any context under Scenario Two. All o f these scores are a 
significant departure from the mid-point with the sole exception of a jury 
trial, in which case defense and plaintiff lawyers share an almost identically 
bleak outlook for success under this scenario.158 '
3. Likelihood o f  Successful Resolution (Either via Adjudication or 
Settlement) and Probability o f  Agreement to Arbitrate
Once again, the last two questions provide the most direct information 
regarding attorneys’ attitudes and beliefs on arbitration. In Scenario Two, 
with a score of 5.61, defense lawyers rated their greatest prospects for 
achieving a successful resolution if the parties litigated the case in federal 
court. They rate their chances for achieving a successful resolution as 4.30 
and 4.58 if the IHRC or an arbitrator respectively hear the case. Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers report their best prospects for achieving a favorable resolution if  an 
arbitrator heard the case (3.38), which is a significant improvement over 
their reported likelihood o f obtaining a favorable result in federal court 
(3.05), or before the IHRC (3.10). All of the recorded scores for this 
inquiry were significantly distinct from the mid-point and significantly 
different from the other sides’ responses.
As for the ultimate question of whether the parties would likely
158. Defense lawyers scored an aggregate 3.63 and plaintiffs’ lawyers scored an aggregate 3.61 on 
this question.
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voluntarily agree to arbitrate, the responses are divided. If  the plaintiff files 
the case in federal court, the defense lawyers reported, with a score of 3.07 
that they would unlikely consent to arbitration. Plaintiffs’ lawyers would 
arbitrate with a score of 4.33. Unlike the defense score, however, the 
plaintiffs’ score of 4.33 is not significant. If  the IHRC were to hear the 
facts of Scenario Two, both sides reported that they were likely to 
voluntarily agree to arbitrate. The aggregate defense attorney response was 
4.51 as compared to 4.49 for plaintiffs’ attorneys. The defense score is 
significantly different from the mid-point while the plaintiffs’ score is not.
Once again, the results seem clear. Post-dispute voluntary arbitration 
will have little, if any, effect on federal court litigation. Plaintiffs’ and 
defense lawyers will rarely, if ever, simultaneously select to arbitrate the 
same case. In fact, defendants will not choose arbitration even in cases 
where it is unlikely that they will prevail in summary judgment or in a 
motion to dismiss. As borne out by the results of the survey described 
above and tabulated below, defense lawyers will not choose to arbitrate 
Scenario Two because they rate their chances of success (either by 
adjudication or settlement) as higher in federal court than in arbitration, and 
rate their chances o f settlement higher in federal court than in arbitration.
Furthermore, while defense lawyers appear decidedly more unwilling 
to agree to arbitrate in Scenario Two, plaintiffs’ lawyers are, at best, 
ambivalent towards the prospect o f arbitration. While plaintiffs’ lawyers 
reported that they were likely to agree to arbitrate if  the parties were to 
litigate the case in federal court, the aggregate score representing plaintiffs’ 
lawyers’ responses was not significant. Plaintiffs’ lawyers also reported 
that their estimated chances o f success and  the chances o f settlement are 
slightly higher in federal court than in arbitration. Because plaintiffs’ 
lawyers are at best ambivalent and management lawyers are evidently 
unwilling to agree to arbitrate a Scenario Two type case, one may 
conservatively conclude that parties will only arbitrate a minimal number, if 
any, of Scenario Two type cases filed in federal court. Again, this may not 
be the case with IHRC cases.
In contrast to their opinions about arbitration when the plaintiff files 
the facts o f Scenario Two in federal court, both sides reported a shared 
willingness to agree to arbitration as an alternative to proceeding before the 
IHRC. Both sides reported that they were likely to agree to arbitration and 
believed that they had a significantly better chance of obtaining a successful 
resolution (via adjudication or settlement) before an arbitrator than before 
the IHRC. However, defense lawyers believed that they had a significantly 
better chance of settling the case if it were before the IHRC (4.18), than if 
they arbitrated it (3.95). The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ score on this question was 
just the opposite, 3.10 if  filed before the IHRC and 3.45 if arbitrated.
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c. Scenario Three
The third scenario’s hypothetical facts were crafted to lead the parties 
to believe that there was a very strong likelihood that a court would grant a 
defendant’s dispositive motion. The question is will either side want to 
arbitrate or will they want to take their chances either in federal court or 
before the IHRC?
1. Chances o f  Settlement
In a scenario that strongly favors the employer, defense lawyers 
expressed a belief that settlement was possible in any o f the three forums. 
Ostensibly, this may be because the third scenario represents a situation in 
which defense lawyers have greater control over settlement due to leverage 
gained from the strong likelihood of success on a dispositive motion. Only 
one o f these scores, however, was significant. Tellingly, management-side 
attorneys believed, with statistical significance, that they would settle the 
case if it were before the IHRC but not if  the parties were to arbitrate or 
litigate the case in federal court. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, significantly 
doubted their chances to settle this case in any o f the three forums.
2. Perceived Chances o f  Successful Adjudication
Defense lawyers’ responses reflect optimism regarding their chances 
for successful adjudicative results under this scenario if an arbitrator, 
federal court judge, an ALJ, and even a jury were to decide the case. While 
the score for the jury is not statistically significant, the other three scores are 
statistically significant. Plaintiff lawyers’ were more pessimistic about their 
chances of obtaining a successful adjudication than defense lawyers were 
confident. Plaintiffs’ lawyers reported that their prospects for success were 
unlikely in any context under Scenario Three. All o f these scores are 
significant from the mid-point including when a jury would hear the case. 
In fact, each score is below 3.
3. Likelihood o f  Successful Resolution (either via Adjudication or 
Settlement) and Probability o f  Agreement to Arbitrate
The final two questions confirm the lawyers’ opinions about their 
chances o f success and are also consistent with the first two scenarios’ 
results. As in the first and second scenarios, management-side attorneys 
perceive that their best chance for success is if the case is in federal court 
and that their smallest chance o f success is before the IHRC. In fact, the 
defense lawyers’ federal court score of 5.61 and the IHRC score of 4.42 are 
both significantly different from the arbitration score of 4.64. Plaintiffs’
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scores are the opposite of the defendants. Plaintiffs report that their best 
chance of success is before the IHRC (2.72), the worst chance in federal 
court (2.53) and arbitration somewhere in the middle (2.66). While the 
Plaintiffs scores are not significant from each other, they are all significant 
from the mid-point.
The defense lawyers’ beliefs about the likelihood of arbitration 
logically follow from their reports on likelihood for successful resolution in 
other forums. Defense lawyers report that they would not agree to arbitrate 
if  this case were in federal court. They would, however, arbitrate if the 
IHRC were to hear the case. Both of these scores, 3.27 (for federal court) 
and 4.26 (for the IHRC) deviate significantly from the mid-point. As 
expected, plaintiffs’ lawyers would arbitrate if this case were in either 
forum. With seemingly strong, but not significant scores of 4.46 for federal 
court and 4.32 for the IHRC, plaintiffs’ lawyers seem to want to avoid 
summary judgment and agree to arbitrate.
d. Overall Conclusions Derived from  the Survey Response Data
The results o f the three scenarios seem clear: post-dispute voluntary 
arbitration will have little if any effect on federal court litigation because 
plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers will rarely, if  ever, simultaneously select to 
arbitrate the same case. In fact, while defendants will clearly not choose 
arbitration in cases where it is likely that they will prevail on a motion for 
summary judgment or in a motion to dismiss, the survey shows that they 
will refuse arbitration even if their success on a dispositive motion seems 
unlikely.
Upon first blush, this result appears anomalous. Given defense 
lawyers’ professed fear o f juries, why would they refuse to arbitrate in 
Scenario One, where summary judgment is not possible and in Scenario 
Two where a successful dispositive motion is unlikely? Perhaps defense 
lawyers refuse arbitration because they believe that they can exploit the 
exorbitant costs and delays of federal court litigation to yield a favorable 
settlement. Indeed, in the first two scenarios where summary judgment is 
unlikely, defense lawyers report, with significance, the likelihood of 
obtaining a settlement. Only in Scenario Three, a situation where the facts 
almost assure a summary judgment motion, do employers report their 
chances of settlement as not being significant.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to arbitrate in Scenarios Two and Three to 
avoid summary judgment. These scores are not, however, significant, 
which could be based on some plaintiffs’ lawyers’ hope to get their case 
heard by a jury. Accordingly, in Scenario One, the only situation in which 
a successful dispositive motion is near impossible for employers, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers report that they are unlikely to arbitrate.
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With respect to cases filed before the IHRC, lawyers on both sides 
seem much more amenable to arbitration. In fact, based on the results of 
the survey reported herein, it seems that a post-dispute voluntary arbitration 
system could be an effective alternative mechanism for efficiently 
adjudicating discrimination cases pending before the IHRC. Thus, though 
the survey response data shows that such a system will have little or no 
effect on the federal court employment-law related docket, post dispute 
voluntary arbitration could have an effect on IHRC litigation. O f course, 
the survey results are a single piece of evidence in the long-running debate 
on the subject. As no data is currently available on lawyers’ preferences on 
resolving federal court claims when a program with post-dispute voluntary 
arbitration was available, it is nearly impossible to definitively prove or 
disprove the preliminary conclusions derived in this article. Data from such 
a program, in effect for cases pending before the IHRC cases in the 1990’s, 
is, however, available and reported in the following section.
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Table 4: Scenarios
Scenar io One Scenario Two Scenario Three
Defense Plaintiff Notes Defense Plaintiff Notes Defense Plaintiff Notes
Lawyers Lawyers Lawyers Lawyers Lawyers Lawyers
Chance of setdement if Litigated in?
Federal 5.03 5.10 1.2 4.25 3.39 1 , 2 , 3 4.16 3.00 2,3
Court (1.41) (1.61) (1.56) (1.86) (1.64) (1.83)
IHRC 4.42 4.00 1 4.15 3.14 2, 3 4.17 2.92 1 , 2 , 3
(1.51) .....(1-60) ....(1.40) (M S ). ('■431 .......(1-69)
Arbitrated 4.29 3.83 1 3.94 3.51 2,3 4.01 3.02 2,3
(1.42) (1.58) (1.41) (1.49) (1.43) (1.68)
Chance for si ccess if adjudicated before a:
ALJ 3.46 3.91 1,3 4.41 3.20 1,2,3 4.37 2.63 1 , 2 , 3
(1.34) (1.38) (1.34) (1.44) (1.46) (1.55)
Federal 4.70 3.95 1,3 5.76 2.95 1 , 2 , 3 5.52 2.29 1 , 2 , 3
Judge (1.28) (1.52) (1.23) (1.94) (1.36) (1.82)
Jury 3.07 4.83 1,2,3 3.81 3.73 4.07 3.04 2 , 3
(1.42) (1.75) (1.45) (1.50) (1.53) (1.63)
Arbitrator 3.89 4.00 4.62 3.24 1 , 2 , 3 4.60 2.83 1 , 2 , 3
(1.07) (1.28) (1.25) (1.46) (1.32) (1.44)
Likelihood to agree to arbitrate if case going to be litigated:
In Federal 3.92 3.61 3.09 4.32 1,3 3.30 4.37 1,3
Court (1.81) (1.96) (1.74) (2.20) (1.72) (2.13)
Before 4.62 4.37 1 4.47 4.48 1 4.23 4.29 1
IHRC (1.56) (1.77) (1.59) (1.82) (1.58) (1.96)
Likelihood fo r successful resolution (adjudicate or settle) if.
Litigated in 4.27 4.05 1 5.59 3.05 1 , 2 , 3 5.53 2.61 1 , 2 , 3
Federal (1.52) (1.67) (1.32) (1.91) (1.38) (1.81)
Court
Litigated 3.32 4.10 1,3 4.29 3.10 1 , 2 , 3 4.39 2.79 1 , 2 , 3
before (1.34) (1.55) (1.40) (1.61) (1.48) (1.65)
IHRC
Arbitrated 3.80 4.00 1 4.59 3.40 1 , 2 , 3 4.61 2.73 1 , 2 , 3
(1.13) (1.48) (1.39) (1.50) (1.42) (1.47)
Continued
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% Settle % Settle N otes % Settle % Settle N otes % Settle % Settle N otes
Would successful resolution most likely result fro m either settlement or adjudication if case:
Litigated in 32% 24% 70% 37% 3 64% 25% 3
Federal
Court
Litigated 24% 43% 3 41% 37% 40% 28%
before
IHRC
Arbitrated 40% 54% 59% 30% 3 56% 23% 3
Notes: For Defense Lawyers, N = 238; for Plaintiff Lawyers, N = 41.
Tables report means, with standard deviations in parentheses.
1. Defense lawyers’ responses significantly different from the midpoint, 4.0, at p < .05.
2. Plaintiff Lawyers’ responses significantly different from the midpoint, 4.0, at p < .05
3. Defense lawyers’ responses significantly different from that o f  the plaintiff lawyers at p < .05
Questions regarding choice to settle or arbitrate were not compared to a midpoint.
B. The IHRC Voluntary Arbitrary Program
One could logically conclude from the analysis above that the parties 
would not use a post-dispute voluntary arbitration program as an alternative 
to federal court. Such a system, however, could function to reduce the 
number of cases filed before the IHRC. Indeed, results from the three 
scenarios suggest that both sides might be positively inclined toward 
arbitration over IHRC litigation 27% of the time. In this section, I compare 
the results of my survey with that of the IHRC’s voluntary arbitration 
program in effect between 1994 and 1998. Before discussing the results of 
the program, the Article explains how the IHRC operates and provide 
necessary background information on the post-dispute voluntary arbitration 
program.
1. Background Information
In Illinois, like many states, employees can file discrimination charges 
with either the federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) or the state agency, the Illinois Department of 
Human Rights (“IDHR”).159 Even though agencies cross-file the claims, the 
agency where the employee initially files it investigates the case. 
Moreover, while the investigation processes o f the EEOC and the IDHR are
159. See Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILL. COMP. S ta t . Ann. 5/1-102 (West Supp. 1982).
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similar, their adjudication processes are quite different. As explained 
above, if the EEOC does not settle or litigate the case itself, it provides the 
employee with a “right to sue” letter, regardless o f whether it finds probable 
cause as to the merit of the allegations. The right to sue letter allows the 
employee to file a lawsuit in federal court.160
Neither the IDHR nor the IHRC litigates cases on behalf of employees. 
Instead, upon completion o f its investigation, the IDHR either finds 
probable cause and assigns the case to the IHRC for trial or dismisses the 
case.161 Employees can request that the IHRC review a dismissal.162 On 
review, the IHRC can either adopt the dismissal or reverse it and set the 
case for trial. If  the IHRC adopts the dismissal, the employee may request a 
right to sue letter from the EEOC (because agencies cross-file the case).163
The IHRC adjudication process, in place between 1994 and 1998, was 
much more similar to that o f a federal or state court as opposed to 
arbitration. As in court, the IHRC’s administrative law judges (“ALJs”) 
follow rules of evidence, engage in motion practice, and maintain extremely 
formal proceedings. In addition, discovery rules parallel those of Illinois’ 
civil procedure code except for the fact that depositions may only be 
ordered upon leave o f the court. There are no jury trials available, however, 
and appeals are made to the “Commission” first and then to the Illinois 
Circuit Court of Appeals.164 Traditional labor lawyers may recognize this 
process as being somewhat similar to that o f the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB”). In fact, one Chicago defense lawyer, quoting a remark 
often made about the NLRB’s administrative law judges, stated that the 
judges at the IHRC “were neutral on the side of employees.”165 Another 
employment lawyer, formerly based in Chicago, stated that, “[Practicing 
before the IHRC] was as expensive, time-consuming, and annoying as 
being in federal court.”166
2. Statistics on Parties ’ Use o f  the IHRC/CEDR Voluntary Arbitration 
Program
Between 1994 and 1998, the IHRC and the Center of Employment 
Dispute Resolution (“CEDR”) established an alternative dispute resolution
160. Supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
161. Interview with Jim Convery, Partner, Laner, Muchin, Dobrow, Becker, Levin & Tominberg, 
in Chicago, 111. (Jan. 4, 2002).
162. Id. See Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 8/1-111 (West Supp. 1982).
163. Interview with Jim Convery, supra note 161.
164. Id.
165. Interview with Cliff Perry, Partner, Laner, Muchin, Dombrow, Becker, Levin, & Tominberg, 
in Chicago, 111. (Jan. 4, 2002).
166. Interview with Peter Albrecht, Partner, Godfrey & Kahn, in Madison, Wise. (Dec. 20, 2001).
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program under which the CEDR offered parties with cases pending before 
the IHRC the opportunity to mediate or arbitrate their claims with the 
CEDR.167 Under the IHRC/CEDR program, CEDR contacted the parties or 
their attorneys in every case on the IHRC docket, informed them of the 
program, and offered them the opportunity to resolve their cases using 
either mediation or arbitration. Unfortunately, neither the IHRC nor the 
CEDR maintained precise records of their correspondence or the overall 
results o f the program. CEDR did, however, provide the authors with 
records o f approximately 1300 IHRC cases in which CEDR contacted each 
o f the parties and offered mediation or arbitration. O f those 1300, there was 
not one case in which both parties agreed to arbitrate or mediate their 
claims.168
These 1300 cases did not, however, encompass the entire universe of 
the cases in the IHRC/CEDR program. Indeed, this number represents 
about half the cases that were on the docket when the program began. 
Given the number of IHRC cases filed per year and CEDR’s own data, I 
estimate that there were more than 6,000 cases in which CEDR contacted 
the parties. Regretfully, I was unable to locate the full data set. I did, 
however, contact Professor Lamont Stallworth, director of CEDR.
Professor Stallworth had no definitive recollection of any specific 
arbitrations occurring under the program. He did say, however, that there 
may have been several. He also reported that there were a number of 
mediations.169
3. An Analysis o f  the IHRC Program’s Ineffectiveness
For the purposes of this article, it is immaterial if  there were zero, 
three, or even sixty (which Professor Stallworth states there were not)170 
arbitrations. The conclusion o f this article is predicated upon the contention 
that post-dispute voluntary arbitration is not effective if  it only affects 1% 
o f the docket. Here, the program clearly affected substantially less than 
1%. Thus, the question becomes why was the program so ineffective?
A second important and closely related question is how to harmonize 
the lack o f participation in the IHRC/CEDR voluntary arbitration program 
with the survey responses that indicate that both defense and plaintiffs’ 
attorneys were more inclined to arbitrate in each scenario if  the IHRC were 
to hear the case. There are at least four explanations for the apparent failure
167. The CEDR program is headed by Professor Lamont Stallworth, Ph.D., o f  Industrial and Labor 
Relations, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois.
168. From the documents I received, it is impossible to know if  one party agreed to ADR.
169. Interview with Professor Lamont Stallworth, Loyola University, Chicago, 111. (July 2001).
170. Id.
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of the program and the inconsistency of the survey and the actual practice.
The first explanation is straightforward— it takes two to arbitrate. 
Indeed, this somewhat obvious principle, inherently problematic to 
voluntary arbitration’s effectiveness, is generally borne out by statistics 
gathered by Professor Stallworth. In order to evaluate the CEDR program, 
Professor Stallworth included surveys with the letters he sent offering ADR 
to the attorneys who represented the parties in the first 3,000 “or so” cases 
included in the program. The CEDR directly contacted parties who did not 
have legal counsel. O f the approximately 6,000 disputants surveyed, 211 
(109 employers or their representatives and 102 employees or their 
representatives) responded, a total o f 3.4%.171 Professor Stallworth reports 
that in “some 200 cases” 172 one side expressed a willingness to agree to 
resort to some form of alternative dispute resolution, but the other side 
would not agree.173 In fact, because there were only 209 responses, it is 
conservative to say that almost every one who responded to the survey 
chose to use ADR. In every such case, however, the other side refused the 
offer. This may be an obvious by-product o f the fact that only 3.4% of 
those surveyed agreed to ADR. If only 3.4% will agree, the odds o f a 
match are only .12%. In other words, these results suggest that we could 
expect roughly three or four agreements to use ADR from the 3,000 cases. 
The plight of voluntary arbitration in the CEDR scheme is further 
compromised by the fact that CEDR’s offer included mediation. Thus, it is 
possible that one or even all four o f those “three or four” cases could be 
agreements to mediate, not to arbitrate.
The argument that it takes two to arbitrate may explain the 
inconsistency between the survey responses and the program. While the 
survey revealed that both sides were willing to arbitrate in each scenario if 
the plaintiff filed the case with the IHRC, none o f the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ 
responses were significant. To further complicate this result, the plaintiffs’ 
responses may have been artificially biased against the IHRC and thus, in 
favor o f arbitration.
The second explanation is that many of the plaintiffs’ lawyers who 
reported an unwillingness to litigate before the IHRC, and therefore a 
willingness to arbitrate, do not file cases with the agency. We base this 
argument on two facts. First, plaintiffs originally select the forum for their 
claims. Specifically, plaintiffs’ lawyers choose whether to file their clients’
171. See Lamont E. Stallworth & Linda K. Stroh, Who Is Seeking To Use ADR  /  Why Do They 
Choose To Do So, 51 DlSP. RESOL. J. 30, 30-38 (1996).
172. The total number o f  responses does not exactly predict the total number o f  cases represented. 
There could have been, at the low end, 109 (the 102 claimants matched the 102 defendants and there 
were seven defendants left over) or, at the high end, 211 cases (if there were no cases where both sides 
responded). Id. at 34.
173. Id.
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claims in federal court or before the IHRC. Second, fairly or unfairly, the 
IHRC has a reputation for having judges that are not as demanding as 
federal court judges, and who side with employees more often than federal 
court judges and even juries. The ALJ’s however, also grant very low 
damage awards. P laintiffs attorneys looking for their “fees” see the IHRC 
as an alternative forum. Plaintiffs lawyers wishing to achieve a high fee 
from a settlement and who are not “afraid” of federal court will not file 
before the IHRC. Several Chicago defense lawyers report that many of the 
city’s best plaintiffs lawyers rarely, if  ever, file claims with the IHRC.174 
Plaintiffs lawyers who never file in the IHRC were part of the survey. 
These lawyers, one can assume, respond by stating they would arbitrate if  a 
case were before the IHRC. The fact that these lawyers are never before the 
IHRC could explain why the survey results conflict with the statistics that 
show the failure of the IHRC/CEDR program.
This argument leads to another question. If  plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
reluctant to file case before the IHRC, why are there so many cases on the 
docket? Again, there are two explanations. First, in the vast majority o f the 
1300 cases we surveyed, the plaintiff filed pro se. There is no reason to 
believe that the rest of the docket is any different. Second, many times 
plaintiffs file with the IDHR and find counsel after the agency investigates 
the case. In these cases, the plaintiffs’ lawyers may request a right to sue 
letter from the EEOC in order to avoid the IHRC.
A third explanation may relate to timing. One o f the recognized 
advantages o f arbitration is its speed.175 Arbitration as a process is simply 
faster than the IDHR-IHRC. The CEDR program, however, contacted the 
parties after they had been through the IDHR investigation. At this point, 
defense lawyers had likely already billed their clients for responding to the 
investigators’ requests and plaintiffs’ lawyers had become familiar with the 
facts o f the case for at least a year. Even though arbitration would offer a 
faster resolution, by the time CEDR contacted the parties, an “expeditious 
resolution” was no longer possible.
A fourth and final explanation for the discrepancy between the results 
of the survey and the IHRC/CEDR program could be that the lawyers were 
uncomfortable about the program itself. Preliminary data, however, shows 
that this is not the case. Our survey asked the lawyers who were practicing 
in Chicago during the CEDR/IHRC program if they arbitrated any cases, 
and if not, why. 209 attorneys responded to the question. O f the 209 
lawyers, twenty-one reported that the question was not applicable, the other 
188 lawyers provided 254 reasons for refusing to arbitrate. O f those 254 
reasons, there was not one negative comment pointed directly at the CEDR.
174. See interviews with Convery and Perry, supra  notes 161 and 165.
175. See supra note 20.
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In fact, only 12 comments were critical of the program at all. These 
comments stated that the program limited the choice of arbitrators and that 
the arbitrators were unqualified or biased. With respect to the comments 
concerning the arbitrators’ abilities, it is not clear if  the respondents were 
focusing on those arbitrators on the CEDR panel or arbitrators in general.
4. Why the CEDR Program Failed
The 254 responses provided to the survey question o f “why did you 
refuse to arbitrate” may provide the most definitive support for the 
proposition that post-dispute voluntary arbitration will not work. The two 
most common reasons cited by the 188 lawyers who responded to the 
question were (1) an overall dislike for arbitration and (2) client preference. 
In fact, these two responses were cited by 47% of the respondents. The 
remaining responses included: (1) the strength o f the case (in 17.5% of the 
answers); (2) negative effect on settlement (9%); (3) time and cost not 
considered helpful (9%); (4) preference for litigation’s procedures (8.5%); 
and (5) not necessary to receive a favorable resolution (5%). These 
responses are revealing because almost all of them focus on the perceived 
ills of arbitration. In fact, answers that reveal a bias against arbitration176 
constitute 68% of the total responses. The remaining 20% of the responses 
consisted o f lawyers who reported that they were not offered arbitration. 
Only three respondents, 1.2%, stated that they would have arbitrated their 
case.
VII.
M a n d a t o r y  V e r s u s  V o l u n t a r y  A r b it r a t io n
A. Why Critics o f  Mandatory Arbitration Advocate For Implementation o f  
a Voluntary Arbitration System That No One Uses
As discussed in greater detail above, critics of mandatory arbitration 
argue that “if  proponents o f arbitration are correct in their belief that it is 
faster, cheaper, and better than the judicial system, then surely employees 
and their attorneys will opt for arbitration in a voluntary system.”177 Some 
critics truly believe that this is the case. After all, in a vacuum, without
176. Included in this category are the following responses: a client’s negative feelings about 
arbitration; a perceived negative effect on settlement; time and cost not helpful; and preference for 
litigation.
177. National Organization o f  Women, a t http://www.now.org/issues/wfw/nasd-testimony.html 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2002) (testimony o f  Patricia Ireland, President o f  the National Organization for 
Women).
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careful dissection of the parties’ motivations and goals and an 
understanding of the factors influencing parties’ decisions to select the most 
advantageous forum to maximize their chances o f obtaining their desired 
outcome, the observation quoted above from National Organization of 
Women President Patricia Ireland appears logical.178 Indeed, some critics 
may contest the results of the survey reported in this article. Some may 
even deny the total lack o f participation in the IHRC/CEDR voluntary 
arbitration program. Some critics may even cite limited instances in which 
parties did voluntarily agree to arbitrate a claim after a dispute has arisen or 
even the limited success of voluntary arbitration programs. I do not assert 
that parties will never agree to arbitrate once a dispute has arisen. I, do, 
however, vigorously contest Ms. Ireland’s above-quoted observation as a 
spurious and misleading notion.
Other critics of mandatory arbitration may not care whether the above­
quoted statement is true or not because they take a myopic view o f the 
entire issue. These critics laud litigation because, one can infer, the critics 
believe that such a system provides the best chance for remuneration. 
These critics do not, however, even acknowledge that under the current 
system may be unjust. They do not discuss the fact that merit is not the 
driving force in determining the resolution o f a case. They do not mention 
that high cost of defense associated with litigation results in incidences of 
“de facto severance” and other forms of systemic leveraging to extort 
settlement for claims with no merit.179 These individuals may not care about 
employers’ costs of defense or the fact that arbitration reduces incidence of 
“de facto severance” and other forms o f systemic leveraging to extort 
settlement for claims with no merit.
Basically, these individuals espouse voluntary arbitration as a 
substitute for mandatory arbitration in the hopes of convincing legislators 
who are cognizant o f the benefits of arbitration yet uncomfortable with the 
fact that employers may offer it to employees on a “take it or leave it” basis, 
to ban mandatory arbitration. For these individuals, if the law banned
178. See id.
179. See Stone, Yellow D og Contracts o f  the 1990s supra note 74; see also Eileen Silverstein, 
From Statute to Contract: The Law o f  the Employment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 H o f s t r a  L a b . &  
Emp. L.J. 479, (2001). Even arbitration critics who acknowledge defacto severence do not see it as a 
problem. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. &  
EMPLOYMENT PO L’y  j. 189, 200 (1997). Professor Bingham states that plaintiffs’ lawyers often take 
cases which they believe are “losers on the merits” because they know employers will often settle these 
cases for as much as $10,000. Arbitration, according to Bingham, will prevent lawyers from taking these 
frivolous cases because the lawyers know that employers will not agree to nuisance settlements when 
the costs o f  defense are greatly reduced. Bingham does not, however, conclude that this conclusion 
supports arbitration nor does she state that the practice she described is problematic because it 
perpetuates institutional extortion. Instead, she uses this conclusion as basis to criticize the fairness o f  
arbitration because, she explains lawyers will no longer take such cases and thus, will not be repeat 
players.
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mandatory arbitration and encouraged voluntary arbitration, critics would 
shed no tears if  participation rates for voluntary arbitration were abysmal. 
In fact, these individuals would likely (incorrectly) conclude from 
theoretical statistics on the abysmal participation rates of voluntary 
arbitration that employers were previously coercing employees into 
agreeing to mandatory arbitration.
B. The Mandatory— Voluntary Paradox Explained
Even if it is true that voluntary arbitration would not accomplish the 
goals noted in this article’s preamble, the question remains: How can the 
author, along with a handful o f other advocates of mandatory arbitration of 
employment disputes, argue that more often than not, parties do not and 
should not select arbitration voluntarily after a dispute has arisen in the 
same breath as he contends that arbitration is fair to all parties including 
employees?
Explaining why employers do, and employees should, regard pre­
dispute arbitration as an improvement over the current system for resolving 
disputes answers this question. Employers who implement mandatory 
arbitration programs are engaging in a risk management system. The 
employers realize that by having all of their disputes arbitrated they can 
avoid the de facto severance system that encourages the settlement of 
frivolous claims because arbitration is more cost-effective than defending 
the case in court or even responding to an investigation. The benefit of 
avoiding these claims outweighs the risk of: (1) increased claims because of 
easier access to an adjudication process; (2) the fact that employer will be 
less able to use the costs and delays o f litigation to wear out the plaintiffs 
and their lawyers when a case has bad facts and high damages; and (3) an 
off-the-wall arbitration opinion that has limited review.180
Employees should welcome pre-dispute arbitration systems because 
employers who have such polices must comply with the law. These 
employers simply cannot risk having legitimate discrimination cases being 
arbitrated on a regular basis. O f course, like those employers who seek to 
use litigation’s costs to derail legitimate claims, employees seeking de facto 
severance are worse off in a pre-dispute arbitration system.
The benefits o f pre-dispute mandatory arbitration are simply not 
present in the post-dispute context. Employers with arbitration policies are 
attempting to pool their risk. They will accept the fact that a case with “bad 
facts” will be adjudicated quickly so they will be forced to settle and they 
will accept having a very limited right of appeal in exchange for not having 
to extend the costs of a court defense or unpredictable jury damage awards.
180. Employers can further hedge their bets with employment practices liability insurance.
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In the post-dispute context, employers are susceptible to all the problems of 
litigation, as well as the negatives of arbitration. In fact, both parties are 
hurt by a post dispute system. Arbitration is an alternative adversarial 
system designed to result in one winner and one loser, a zero-sum game. 
After the plaintiff has filed a claim, either side may find itself perched on 
the high end of the litigation seesaw, with a considerable tactical, economic 
or political advantage over its opposition. That is simply the reality o f our 
legal system. Accepting arbitration from that vantage point would be 
unwise because all o f the advantages gained by playing on the litigation 
seesaw would vanish on the level playing field offered by arbitration.
This is borne out by this Article’s analysis of the results of the survey 
and the data on the use (or lack thereof) of the IHRC’s voluntary arbitration 
program. Post-dispute, voluntary arbitration is conceptually as fair, just, 
and recommendable as its pre-dispute mandatory cousin. We are, however, 
realistic in our expectations o f parties. No party should be expected to 
voluntarily forfeit an advantage it earned or otherwise lawfully acquired. 
Expecting this from parties would be like asking someone who is risk- 
averse and already seated at a $10,000 ante blackjack table (possibly by 
mistake) that was just dealt an ace and a king if he would like to move to 
the $2 ante table before the dealer reveals his cards. Even if he is risk- 
averse, the likelihood of his accepting the offer is slim to none. In contrast, 
mandatory arbitration is like giving that same risk-averse individual the 
option of moving to a lower-stakes table before he sees any o f  the cards 
being dealt. That is the intrinsic fairness of mandatory arbitration and the 
reason why it works where post-dispute voluntary arbitration fails.
VIII.
C o n c l u s i o n
The decision to arbitrate is only one factor that complicates the already 
intricate calculus employment lawyers must consider in representing their 
clients’ interests. Litigation invariably involves an immense degree of 
strategic action and planning by both parties. Specifically, the litigants 
must avoid any and all actions that may signal weakness to the opposition. 
This includes desperate offers to settle, mediate, or arbitrate a dispute. For 
cases filed in federal court, the parties invariably play a game of “trial 
chicken” with each other where neither side flinches at the prospect of 
actually convincing a jury of his clients’ position or footing the Herculean 
legal fees associated with going to trial. Obviously, in such an important 
game of brinkmanship, varying degrees o f actions that signal weakness 
exist. A party may not perceive an offer to arbitrate to be as desperate as an 
offer to settle coupled with a strong signal to accept a weak settlement offer. 
However, the party that initially extends the offer to arbitrate runs the risk
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of appearing weak, especially if the other party rejects the offer. The 
potential for identifying a weakness continues even after a party accepts the 
offer to arbitrate when the parties begin negotiating the terms of the actual 
arbitration. For instance, if one side learned of new information or even a 
witness it wished to conceal, a party who demands more draconian 
limitations on discovery might strongly signal the opposition to back out of 
its initial agreement to arbitrate. This is merely one example of the 
numerous factors that may drastically influence attorneys’ decisions on how 
to ensure victory for their clients and secure adequate fees for themselves.
Cataloguing the factors that influence an attorney’s decision regarding 
alternative forms o f resolving disputes is beyond the scope o f this article. 
Every lawyer relies on a different pre-trial strategy heavily affected by his 
own personality, life experiences, and o f course, the information given to 
him by his client. This article offers initial empirical support for what the 
author regards as a logical and expected result: parties fail to 
simultaneously agree to arbitrate claims after they have arisen. Obviously, 
there may be explanations other than the ones presented herein for the 
variant aggregate scores from which the author derives his conclusions. 
But after carefully scrutinizing both the results of the survey and the data on 
the voluntary arbitration program in place at the IHRC in the 1990s, the 
explanations offered are the most plausible.
The critical point of both this Article and the debate on the arbitration 
o f employment disputes is that lawyers must make realistic comparisons by 
carefully scrutinizing not only the offered alternative, but also the forum 
from which that alternative is proposed. Thus, this Article first addresses 
the legality o f mandatory arbitration and then discusses criticisms of 
mandatory arbitration before it explains why post-dispute voluntary 
arbitration is not a viable compromise in the debate. Indeed, that is why a 
lawyer considering whether mandatory arbitration is an advantageous 
alternative to traditional litigation, must carefully evaluate a litigant’s other 
options for pursuing and defending his claims. Arbitration must be 
weighed against filing charges with the EEOC or an equivalent state agency 
and against settling claims without adjudication. Clearly after lawyers 
analyze their firms’ incentives, and their clients’ as well, it is clear that 
post-dispute voluntary arbitration will not decongest the discrimination law 
docket because it takes two to arbitrate.
